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its importance in the recent increase in capital shares, covered in previous research. Moreover, in the early 20th century 
technology appears to have worked more as a substitute for labour, while after mid-century it has become rather complementary 
and efficiency-improving. In addition, the ICT era has brought along an increase in market concentration, implying that technology 
operates also potentially through rising economic rents. Union power had a non-trivial role in inflating labour share during the 
post-WWII decades. Finally, import exposure has increased labour share presumably by squeezing profits, but its significance is 
overshadowed by the other covariates. 
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1 Introduction
Figure 1: Net adjusted labour share in selected countries 1900–2015
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During the last forty years or so, the income split between wages and capital in-
come has turned drastically in favour of the latter in practically all rich Western
economies. This trajectory has puzzled the academia because of its extent and diffi-
cult interpretation. Is it another manifestation of rising inequality within countries,
or an unforeseen shift in the means of production, with no connection to economic
inequality? While the evidence is not fully consistent, the conventional wisdom is,
that the decreasing labour share is related to the rising inequality in personal level,
arising from the great concentration of capital income relative to wages.
In addition to the valuable insights considering economic inequality, the decreasing
labour share has been claimed to indicate a transformation towards a more capital-
intensive economy. As such, it has been linked to automatisation and to a growing
worry of the demise of labour as we know it. Perhaps the most well-known warning
comes from Brynjolfsson and McAfee, who state that unless the issue is tackled with
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policy, part of the population ends up having ‘nothing to offer’ to businesses.1
Since the proposed outlooks following diminishing labour share are altogether grim,
a question of what one should do in order to stop the ongoing trend has emerged.
But in order to come up with the appropriate policy suggestions, one must know
what exactly determines the income share of labour. Without an accurate diagnosis,
the policy can turn out counterproductive.
Figure 1 presents the net adjusted labour share in Finland and a few other European
economies. Considering the sample at hand, the big picture looks remarkably simi-
lar: after a turbulent half a century, the labour share grows after WWII for some 40
years, and then decreases another four decades. Because of the apparent similarity
in trend and timing, the recent downhill has been suggested to result from global
factors, such as accelerating globalisation and technological change.2 However, be-
cause the lack of data, the long-term determinants of labour share have rarely been
examined. Thus, the story of decreasing labour share in a more globalized and au-
tomatized world has been missing a robustness comparison to the more autarchic
and technologically-regressed past.
In this thesis, I exploit the relatively abundant Finnish data considering the labour
share and the most common explanatory variables. My aim is to provide empirical
evidence about the long-term determinants of labour share, particularly in Finland,
but hopefully extensible to similar economies as well. My research question is the
following:
◦ What factors have determined the changes in labour share in Finnish industry
over the 20th century?
To sum up my results, I find that the variation in labour share is mostly due to
technological advancement and changes in bargaining power. The impact of tech-
nology is primarily based on a negative relation between labour share and total
factor productivity. It affects secondarily through capital accumulation. However,
capital accumulation appears to be partly capturing the influence of an increase in
the bargaining power of employers. Working to the opposite direction, union den-
1Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011, p. 8.
2Labour Losing to Capital: What Explains the Declining Labour Share? 2012.
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sity’s positive coefficient signifies a boost to the bargaining power of labour. Finally,
positive connection between import exposure and the labour share is interpreted to
benefit the employee-side as well, by cutting profits on product markets.
The structure of this thesis is the following: after introduction, I represent the theory
around labour share in chapter 2. Next, I give a brief introduction to previous
research considering the subject in chapter 3. In chapter 4, I construct a theoretical
model to illustrate the mechanisms behind the labour share, which is empirically
tested in chapter 7. In between, I cover the empirical methodology in chapter 5 and
describe my dataset in chapter 6. In chapter 8 I build a historical narrative, trying
to explain the empirical results, and connect the narrative to the theoretical model
to make my claims as transparent as possible. Chapter 9 concludes.
3
2 Theory
Among research papers considering functional income distribution, its common prac-
tice to start out with a quick reference to Nicholas Kaldor. Kaldor famously stated,
that the income split between capital and labour, more conveniently known as factor
shares, is a remarkably constant condition.3 Later, this statement, and five others,
were titled nobly as Kaldor’s facts. As mentioned, the reference is quite frequent,
and not least because this particular fact turned out to be fiction: from around
the 1990s, the long-lived steadiness of capital and labour share began to appear
markedly outdated, as capital increased its piece regardless of national borders.
Kaldor’s statement, however, faced also serious contemporary scepticism, notedly
exemplified by Solow and Arrow et al.4 Though Kaldor’s claim does not awake much
heated debate anymore per se, the discussion around factor share determinants is
still very much alive.
2.1 Long-term explanations
Neither the long run development nor drivers of factor shares have evoked nearly as
much attention as the medium run. A few efforts of theorizing the regularities still
exist. Firstly, there is the story of remarkable stability: like Kaldor rightfully noted,
regardless of the enormous leaps in economic development labour and capital share
have proven to be surprisingly constant variables on aggregate level. According to
Lebergott, the stability of factor shares is a very logical consequence of the stability
of factor prices. Because factor prices drift towards equilibrium, they never invoke
any considerable shocks to shares. The price of capital, r, is highly dependent on
the wage rate, w, paid on the industry that produces the capital goods. Hence,
if the wages rise, capital’s price follows, and the two never alter from each other
significantly. Market mechanism eliminates wage differentials between industries,
which guarantees that the correlation between capital price and wage rate remains
unbreakable.5
3Kaldor 1957, pp. 591–593.
4Solow 1958; Arrow et al. 1961.
5Lebergott 1964, pp. 57–64.
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Some fifty years of new data and a pile of studies since the days of Kaldor and
Lebergott, there is a fairly well-established consensus that the factor shares are not
so stable as they used to appear. Shares variate without a doubt on the medium
term, and despite the aggregate level stickiness, there are significant industry level
differences. One famous theory predicting shifts in factor shares is the good old
Kuznets curve. Named after its celebrated developer, the Kuznets curve tells that
the industrial revolution first favours the capitalists and skilled employees, which
realizes as an increasing capital share. After a while, the excess profits created
by technological advancement diminish, and the complementariness between capital
and the skilled workforce eases. At the same time, the excess supply of unskilled
employees runs out, experience and productivity of the oldest of the unskilled rises,
and their relative and absolute number grows. Thus, the relative position of labour
inevitably improves, signifying a decrease in capital share. During this period of
change and adjustment which, according to Kuznets, can take for a solid hundred
years, the capital share draws a U-shaped pattern.6
The Kuznets curve is, of course, a pretty simplistic prediction. Its vagueness al-
lows lots of flexibility which can be rightfully judged of inconsistency: because the
hypothesis that Kuznets curve sets is so crude, its success really depends on ar-
bitrariness.7 There is no standard framework to test whether the capital share is
U-shaped or not. A harsher piece of critique, coming from Piketty, claims that
Kuznets’ theory is nothing more but a Cold War product. According to Piketty,
Kuznets curve’s real intention was to prevent developing countries from turning into
communism. The idea is that the curve had a soothing mission: the modernisation
process will eventually eliminate capitalism-driven inequality, so there is no need to
pursue a more egalitarian society.8
In Piketty’s view, economic inequality decreased during the short 20th century be-
cause of the political and economic turmoil during 1914–1945. The two world wars
and the Great Depression demolished capital and brought a change in politics, which
6Scho¨n 2004, p. 4.
7A refined version of the Kuznets curve, known as the Kuznets cycle, represents the possibility
of numerous Kuznets curves. In contrast to Kuznets curve, Kuznets cycle is not tied to the
industrial revolution, and can be initiated by any break in the economy. Nonetheless, the pitfall
of arbitrariness remains. For a more detailed description, see Milanovic 2017; Scho¨n 2004.
8Piketty 2016, p. 25.
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drove down the importance of capital income and began an unforeseen redistribu-
tion of earnings through taxes and transfers. The position of employees was also
strengthened, since the public opinion demanded, and the wartime effort had to
be compensated. In short, while Kuznets curve states that inequality varies due
to economic forces, Piketty stresses politics. Piketty’s hypothesis could be criti-
cized appealing to a lack of causal or even descriptive statistical evidence: while the
narrative may sound persuasive, capital incomes could have shrank because of any
unknown factor which changed simultaneously with politics.
2.2 Medium-term explanations
2.2.1 Technology
The very first and still the most popular theory considering the determination of
factor shares in the medium term is the neoclassical one. In neoclassical theory,
factor shares are determined solely by production technology. Shocks to production
technology, practically the non-stopping technological advancement, either alters
relative factor prices or factor endowments. Plainly, the relationship can be stated
as
total profits
total wages
= r
w
× K
L
(1)
where r is the price of capital, w is the wage rate, K is capital and L is labour.9
The relation between the two ratios in the right-hand equation is taken as given:
when relative factor prices r
w
increase, the relative factor endowments K
L
must de-
crease.10 This is intuitive: if the price of capital relative to labour increases, the
relative amount of capital has to shrink, when businesses substitute from relatively
expensive capital to cheap labour. In other words, if one ratio changes, the sign
of the other ratio’s corresponding change is assumed to be known. With the help
of this assumption, it is possible to define another crucial concept, known as the
9See, for example Atkinson 1975, p. 171; Glyn 2011, p. 105.
10Atkinson 1975, p. 171.
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elasticity of substitution:
elasticity of substitution = σ =
percentage change in
(
K
L
)
percentage change in
(
w
r
) (2)
Elasticity of substitution is the formal statement of the relation between r
w
and
K
L
. It reveals how much the capital-labour ratio changes when the relative price
of labour changes by one percent, and is a positive number by definition.11 From
equation (2) it becomes immediately clear, that if capital-labour ratio responds more
than proportionately to a one percent change in relative price of labour, elasticity
of substitution is above unity. In that case, technical change is said to be capital
augmenting. When technical change is of capital augmenting nature, the quantity
effect dominates the price effect in equation (1). When this happens, technical
change increases capital’s share of income.
In empirical literature, elasticity of substitution is typically estimated to be below
unity.12 So in real world, price effect often overcompensates the quantity affect, and
technical change is labour augmenting, accordingly. The causal channel is by no
means definitive: it is equally possible that changes in relative factor supply yields
a change in relative factor price.13 Regardless of the causality’s direction, however,
equation (2) holds, and the elasticity of substitution can be defined.
Elasticity of substitution is closely related to another well-known trajectory, called
skill-biased technological change. This refers to a phenomenon where technologi-
cal progress treats employees unevenly, regarding to their skill-level. Specifically,
technological change enhances a trend where capital works as a complement for
the skilled and substitute for the unskilled.14 Therefore, technological change’s net
effect on labour share becomes ambiguous: it depends on which impact is the dom-
inant one, the former or the latter.15 In recent decades, the substitution effect has
been suggested to become increasingly dominant, turning technological change ac-
tually capital augmenting. This turn implicates equivalently, that the elasticity of
11Borjas 2010, p. 110.
12D. Autor, Dorn, F. Katz, et al. 2017, p. 1; Rowthorn 1999.
13O. J. Blanchard, Nordhaus, and Phelps 1997, p. 94.
14Borjas 2010, p. 300.
15Guerriero and Sen n.d., p. 7; Schneider 2011, p. 16.
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substitution has risen above unity.16
The reason why technological change includes a skill-level bias lies in productivity.
Modern capital, for example ICT-capital, boosts the productivity of the skilled
workforce.17 However, in many unskilled occupations like service jobs, boosting the
productivity of labour is difficult: better scissors or the latest cash register might
improve barber’s and cashier’s productivity by a bit, but not much. Therefore,
labour is substituted by tireless and fixed-cost capital whenever possible. In the
above example, the barber’s job could prove too costly to substitute, but the cashier
might not be so lucky.18
The neoclassical explanation of technology as the sole determinant of factor shares
has a few caveats. Firstly, it assumes perfect competition.19 With the postulation of
factor shares evolving in a vacuum where technological advancement is the only thing
that can produce variation, neoclassical explanation states that firms or employees
have no bargaining power. Secondly, there are the measurement issues: there is no
collective consensus about the indicator for technological advancement. Commonly
used proxies for technological progress are, for example, ICT capital, capital-labour
ratio, TFP growth rate or simply time trend. Every one of these measures includes
apparent interpretative difficulties, which is not surprising since technological change
is not something directly observable.20
2.2.2 Globalisation
Perhaps the second most popular explanation for changes in factor shares is the
intensity of globalisation. Globalisation refers vaguely to the increasing international
circulation of products and factors. It effects factor shares through both.
16Du¨nhaupt 2013; Stockhammer 2013, p. 5.
17Hamermesh 1996, p. 351.
18The difficulty of automating different occupations is related to the research around labour
market polarisation, famously addressed in D. H. Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003. Considering my
example, barber’s occupation represents a manual occupation, while cashier could be categorized
as a routine cognitive occupation. According to the routinisation hypothesis presented in Autor,
Levy & Murnane, due to a relatively large amount of programmable routine task-input, cashier’s
work is more likely to be automated than barber’s. See also D. H. Autor 2015.
19Atkinson 1975; Du¨nhaupt 2013; Glyn 2011, See, for example.
20Borjas 2010, p. 301; Stockhammer 2013, pp. 11–12.
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Trade theory has certain implications about the expected effect of international
trade on factor shares. The most direct prediction comes from Heckscher-Ohlin (H-
O) theorem. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem states, that ”each country will export
the good that uses its abundant factor intensively”.21 The inevitable outcome of
this is that the abundant factor gains from international trade, while the scarce
factor loses. Instead of letting the forces of demand and supply diminish the price
of the abundant factor, trade allows countries to specialize. Specializing enables
an economy to focus its production on the factor-abundant industry. Hence, the
relatively abundant factor is absorbed without decreasing its price. Consequently,
the factor prices equalize: the abundant factor’s price, which was low on a state of
autarchy, rises because international trade increases its demand. The scarce factor’s
price, which was high on autarchy, drops as international trade expands its supply.22
Another relevant theory considering trade and factor shares is the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem. The theorem claims, that as a product’s relative price increases, so does
the real rate of return on that factor which is primarily exploited in its produc-
tion. Simultaneously, the other factor’s real rate of return decreases. Simply put,
the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem further intensify the mechanism
described in the H-O theorem.23
According to the above theorems, employees in poor countries should gain from
international trade. Trade allows these countries to specialize in labour-intensive
production, and expands their potential market from local to global. However,
inequality in terms of both personal and functional income distribution has experi-
enced a growing trend in poor countries in the recent few decades as well.24 Clearly
contradicting with theory, this anomaly has been reasoned with a few possible ex-
planations: first, the internationally driven demand for exporting industries in poor
countries might have benefitted exclusively the skilled workforce. In other words,
the unskilled employees in rich countries have been substituted with the skilled in
poor countries, while trade has represented the transmitting mechanism. Second,
21Feenstra 2004, p. 32.
22Du¨nhaupt 2013, p. 16; Feenstra 2004, pp. 32–35; Freeman 2009, pp. 583–584.
23Guerriero and Sen n.d., pp. 3–4; Feenstra 2004, pp. 15–16; Stockhammer 2009, p. 12; Stock-
hammer 2013, p. 6.
24Freeman 2009, pp. 591–592.
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the anomaly could be due to the usual suspect, skill-biased technological change: as
poor countries have copied and utilized technology from rich countries, it rewards
mainly the skilled, through same logic as in rich countries.25
As it was with the neoclassical explanation, trade theory is not flawless. It comes
with different variations, which necessarily have divergent presumptions and conclu-
sions. The H-O theorem and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem both imply that the
relative factor endowments are the principle driver behind the ongoing international
trade. Despite of the intuitive appeal, they fail to address the growing inequality in
poor countries. Ricardian trade models which draw their predictions from technolog-
ical differences and comparative advantage, prove more successful in this endeavour.
In Ricardian spirit, technological differences between countries create differences in
factor demand, which induces factor flows. Therefore, skilled workforce and capi-
tal drift towards rich countries, magnifying the initial factor endowments between
countries. Accordingly, the supply of ‘good jobs’ increases in rich countries, while it
decreases in poor countries. Hence, the factor flows actually reduces inequality in
advanced countries, and increases it in poorer countries.26
Because of the poor predictive power of the above presented mainstream trade the-
ories, other explanations determining the relation between trade and labour share
have been put forward. In contrast to technology or factor endowments, one hy-
pothesis emphasizes market imperfections. According to Schneider, trade decreases
that factor’s income share which is enjoying bigger excess profits.27 It could be either
the labour or capital, depending on the relative leverage of unions and businesses.
I refer to this hypothesis as the excess profit hypothesis and with the benefit of
hindsight claim it to be the most appropriate in the context of Finnish industry.
The flow of factors plays a vital part in another phenomenon occurring with glob-
alisation, namely financialisation. Globalisation continuously transforms – and for
a large part, has transformed – labour and capital markets from national to global
scale. Especially during the 1990s, when China, India and the former Soviet bloc
opened up rapidly to the world market, the global relative factor endowments experi-
25Freeman 2009, p. 592.
26Ibid., pp. 584–585.
27Schneider 2011, pp. 23–24.
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enced a drastic change. Combined with capital mobility, the low capital-labour ratios
in the newcomer countries expanded the range of investment opportunities.28 The
mobility guarantees that capital can be placed or outsourced wherever it produces
the highest return. Accordingly, increasing outsourcing or a threat of outsourcing
can intensify capital’s chase for profits, which results in a downward pressure on
labour share.29
Measuring abstract phenomena like globalisation or financialisation is tricky. The
conventional indicator for the former is the GDP share of exports and imports.30
Alternatively, globalisation has been proxied with the value of imports, transformed
to mimic the costs of domestic production.31 Financialisation is a more recent de-
terminant candidate for factor shares and hence has appeared in previous research
only on occasion. It has been proxied by GDP share of external liabilities and assets
and foreign direct investment flows.32
2.2.3 Bargaining theory
Third theory tradition closely connected to factor shares is bargaining theory. Ac-
cording to bargaining theory, employers and employees partake in a distribution of
rents as they negotiate over prices and wages. In a situation of perfect competition,
neither parties have any bargaining power, and they take prices and wages as given:
prices gravitate towards equilibrium in production markets, and wages adjust to
supply and demand in labour markets. Bargaining theory abandons the ideal of
perfect competition, and states that both employers and employees pursue excess
profits and wages, respectively. Hence, prices and wages are settled in a negotiation
process, conditioned to corresponding bargaining power of both parties. Increase in
monopoly power puts upward pressure on prices and, consequently, profits, as an
28Freeman 2009, pp. 577–579; Jaumotte and Tytell 2007, pp. 161–162.
29Understanding the Downward Trend in Labor Income Shares 2017, p. 131; Stockhammer 2013,
pp. 7–8.
30For example in The Labour Income Share in the European Union 2007; Guerriero and Sen
n.d.; Harrison 2005; Stockhammer 2013.
31Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin 2013, p. 41.
32Guerriero and Sen n.d., p. 22; Understanding the Downward Trend in Labor Income Shares
2017, p. 125; Stockhammer 2013, p. 19.
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addition in union power drags up wages, and henceforth the wage bill.33
Theoretically, there is some ambiguousness about the effect of union power to labour
share. The loss of consensus considers especially the labour market institutions in
general. On one hand, strengthening the labour market institutions might boost
the labour share up on the short run, but on the long run, however, more employee-
beneficiary institutions may spur unemployment. As militant unions drag the equi-
librium wage up it might eliminate job opportunities, increase unemployment, and
turn the net effect negative. Equivalently, bigger unemployment benefits can cre-
ate incentives to prefer unemployment instead of gently constraining labour supply.
Empirically, the intuitively more plausible positive effect of union power has been
hard to establish.34
The difficulty of verifying union premium of labour share statistically might be a bit
due to measurement problems. The classical proxy for union power is union density
and another quite used is the number work days lost due to strikes.35 Union density
does not experience much variation over time, which can make its impact hard
to identify. It also does not measure exactly what one is looking for when trying
to capsulate union power: the behaviour of unions can change in time through
number of reasons which do not yield instant feedback to density. Another issue
is endogeneity: it is quite possible that the relation between union density and
labour share, which is of interest here, does not run solely from the first to the
latter. Instead the two variables could experience simultaneous causality: changes
in labour shares causes changes in union density, as well.36
A firm with monopoly power squeezes labour share by setting prices higher than
competitive firm. In theory, monopolist actually pays equal wages compared to
competitive firm, i.e. wM = wC .37 The negative effect on labour share stems from
the higher-than-normal prices, which yield excess profits and result naturally to a
reduction in labour’s share of value added.38
33Atkinson 1975, pp. 174–175; O. J. Blanchard, Nordhaus, and Phelps 1997, pp. 101–103; O.
Blanchard 1998, p. 6.
34Schneider 2011, p. 23.
35Schneider 2011, p. 23; Bengtsson 2014, p. 306; Bentolila and Saint-Paul 2003.
36Visser and Checchi 2009, p. 237.
37Borjas 2010, pp. 197–198.
38O. J. Blanchard, Nordhaus, and Phelps 1997, pp. 101–103.
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Since monopoly is the only producer on the market, its production decision affects
inevitably on the price. Analogous to competitive markets, when monopoly increases
production, the price it receives decreases. The fact that monopolist’s production
affects the price is an important insight: it leads to a situation where it is rewarding
for a monopoly to restrain its production.39 Intuitively, because monopoly restrains
its production to maximize profits, it logically also employs less than a competitive
firm.40
There are couple of widely popular indicators for monopoly power. First of these
is cumulative market share of n largest firms or simply a concentration ratio. The
obvious disadvantage of the concentration ratio is that it only pictures market struc-
ture at an arbitrary point n. Industries with different market structures can produce
an identical ratio, and the structure of an industry might look different a t an al-
ternative point. A little help to these caveats provides another measure, known
as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (H). The index is produced through a simple
calculation: H = ∑ni=1 s2i , where si is the market share of the ith firm. As such, it
includes a slightly more info about the specific market structure of an industry than
the concentration ratio.41
In addition to the measurement problems above, the definition of markets is an-
other source of complexity. In the case of some businesses, producing possibly a
great variation of products at home and abroad, their market of operation is hard
to point out. The definition of markets is necessarily arbitrary and often hinges on
the classification done by statistical authorities for very different purposes. Finally,
the relation between monopoly power and profits is possibly endogenic. It is plau-
sible that a fierce price competition forces the surviving companies to rely on scale
production, which decreases the share of labour. Thus, harsh competition could
lead to low labour shares and great market shares alike.42
39Pepall, Richards, and Norman 2011, pp. 24–28.
40Borjas 2010, pp. 92–93 & 197.
41Pepall, Richards, and Norman 2011, pp. 66–68.
42Ibid., pp. 68–72.
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3 Previous research
The interest in functional income distribution must be justified. It is not an ideal
indicator of economic inequality, so what is the essential motivation? According to
Atkinson, factor shares connect valuably income distribution’s macro and house-
hold levels. Because capital income is a lot more concentrated than labour income,
factor shares offer us an informative glance to personal income distribution.43 Sec-
ondly, they allow examining income distributions’ fairness from the perspective of
income sources, which is stressed by Glyn.44 As an empirical verification, Bengtsson
and Waldenstro¨m present persuasive long-run evidence about a negative connec-
tion between labour share and two personal inequality measures, top income shares
and Gini coefficients.45 There is no uniform consensus, however: Francese & Mulas-
Granados dig into the same issue with a modern, multinational dataset spanning
from 1970 to 2013, and find contradictive results.46 Nonetheless, it is safe to say,
that typically some inverse relation between labour share and economic inequality
is expected.
Bassanini and Manfredi throw out another intriguing question, by asking whether
the universal rise in capital shares, often denoted to technological change, is a tem-
porary phenomenon or a lasting trajectory unless addressed?47 To put differently,
in terms of shrinking labour shares is there more to come, ceteris paribus? Rognlie
provides a sceptical view, arguing that labour share is just balancing back to its
post-WWII state, instead of plunging to an endless pit.48 Rognlie’s time frame is
also longer than usual, but not as long as the one in Piketty, whose projections share
the same pessimism as Bassanini and Manfredi.
43Piketty 2016, pp. 224–225.
44Atkinson 2009; Glyn 2011, p. 103.
45Bengtsson and Waldenstro¨m 2017, pp. 11–16.
46Francese and Mulas-Granados 2015, pp. 15–17.
47Bassanini and Manfredi 2012, p. 35.
48Rognlie 2015, p. 12.
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3.1 Measurement issues
Typically, factor shares are determined by firstly calculating the labour share and re-
garding the rest bluntly for capital. Strictly speaking, labour share is the proportion
of value added that goes for labour, stated formally as:
LS = employee compensation
value added
= W × L
P ×Q (3)
where W is the average employee compensation, L is the labour input, P is the price
of production and Q is the quantity of production.
Capital share refers to the proportion of value added paid for capital, i.e. the
proportion of capital income. Capital income consists of rents, dividends, profits,
capital gains, royalties and other income, which is due to owning land, real estate,
financial capital, productive capital or other kinds of capital.49 Normally, factor
shares are defined exploiting the data in National Accounts. Not surprisingly, the
crude split does not come without difficulties. Either one of the variables can include
easily something unwanted, without certain adjustments. Firstly, when calculating
factor shares one should use value added in factor prices rather than market prices as
a denominator. Otherwise the capital share will include indirect taxes and transfers,
which do not account as capital income.50
Next, it is necessary to decide whether one is interested in gross or net shares: in
other words, should we pick gross or net value added. While net shares describe
specifically ‘who gets what’, gross shares reveal more about the production structure
of economy: is production capital or labour intensive, respectively. The former is a
better indicator for inequality and the latter measures specifically economy’s factor
dominancy. Commonly, the choice is determined by data availability.51
The labour income of self-employed is rarely specified when collecting data. Their
total income is regarded as ‘mixed income’ instead.52 Should mixed income be ac-
49Piketty 2016, p. 28.
50See, for example, Bengtsson 2014, p. 293; Bengtsson and Waldenstro¨m 2017, p. 44 or Glyn
2011, p. 108
51More in Bengtsson and Waldenstro¨m 2017, pp. 43–44; Glyn 2011, p. 108; Rognlie 2015, pp. 3–
7 or Schwellnus, Kappeler, and Pionnier 2017, p. 9
52Piketty 2016, p. 189.
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counted as labour or capital income? This is a key question and presents the most
crucial adjustment yet: the imputation of self-employed income. The adjustment is
especially important in longer series as the relative amount of self-employed changes
drastically. After this adjustment, labour share is transformed into adjusted labour
share, which is commonly formulated in literature as:
ALS = W × E
V A
× (E + SE)
E
= W × (E + SE)
V A
(4)
where W is the average wage of employees, E is the number of employees and SE
is the number of self-employed.53 The adjustment’s effective meaning is that wage
level of employees and self-employed is set equal, in practice.
The above corrections are standard procedures in empirical work. Additionally, one
can problematize other things. For example, how should one handle owner’s earnings
is a valid question. Typically, owner’s earnings are accounted as labour income, since
they appear in businesses’ wage bills, but this is due to a data feature and not a
necessity.54 The trouble around owner’s earnings signify the fact that growing wage
dispersion might actually increase labour’s share, which makes it defective indicator
of inequality. Another issue is changes in production structure: when looking at
factor shares at the aggregate level the changes stem from within and between
industries. The latter implicates that variation in proportions of total value added
between industries reflect to aggregate level changes in factor shares which might
delude into false conclusions.55 Lastly, there is the puzzle of non-market sector.
Since non-market employers, like governments and households, do not produce any
profit, their net value added is calculated through costs, yielding a labour share of
100 percent. Hence, variation in the non-market sector’s proportion of total GDP
creates unwanted aggregate level changes. In the other extreme, in owner-occupied
housing labour share converges to zero. Thus, factor share calculations routinely
focus on mere market sector.56 This hold true for the study at hand, as well.
53See Arpaia, Pe´rez, and Pichelmann 2009 or Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin 2013.
54Krueger 1999, p. 3.
55Arpaia, Pe´rez, and Pichelmann 2009, pp. 7–8; Kyyra¨ 2002, pp. 7–9.
56Du¨nhaupt 2013, p. 2; Glyn 2011, pp. 109–112.
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3.2 Determinants
The research considering determinants of factor shares is for the most part empiri-
cal. Methodology relies typically on panel regressions, where the above theories are
tested via regressing labour share with different proxies for technological change,
globalisation and bargaining power. The data starts usually from around the 1970s,
and is collected on cross-country or cross-industry level. Theoretical approaches
represent a minority.
Interest towards the drivers of functional income distribution has been on the rise in
the 2010s as the spectacularly uniform decline in labour shares from around the 1980s
has become better documented. It was covered famously by Piketty and Zucman,
who point out a parallel contraction in Continental European and Anglo-Saxon
countries, but also in Japan.57 Du¨nhaupt discovers the decline, as well, but clarifies
that the Anglo-Saxon experience is somewhat less distinct.58 Glyn examines longer
time series, and adds, that in many industrialized countries labour share draws a
hump shape over the 20th century, which peaks somewhere after the 1960s.59
Similarly to competing theories, technological change is the most successful deter-
minant of factor shares among research papers as well. As a prominent example
European commission (EC) finds technology, proxied by capital-labour ratio and
ICT capital, the most important driver of labour share. EC’s results are based on
panel regressions in a cross-country dataset consisting of various European countries.
Evidence in favour of skill-bias is also presented.60 Jaumotte and Tytell carry out
similar analysis with similar methodology and variable definitions, finding similar re-
sults.61 Hutchinson and Persyn follow suit, proxying technological change with total
factor productivity and capital-output ratio. Their panel dataset is a cross-country-
industry mix.62 Bassanini and Manfredi count on identical proxies as Hutchinson
and Persyn and come up with comparable conclusions, operating also on country
57Piketty and Zucman 2014.
58Du¨nhaupt 2013.
59Glyn 2011.
60The Labour Income Share in the European Union 2007, pp. 255, 259–260.
61Jaumotte and Tytell 2007, pp. 13–16.
62Hutchinson and Persyn 2012, pp. 29–30, 36.
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and industry level.63 A more recent paper from IMF reaffirms their results from
ten years back. This time, IMF uses a relative price index of investment goods as
a proxy for technological advancement.64 On theoretical side, Karabarbounis and
Neiman utilize also the relative price of investment and declare its decline as the
most important driver of the global decrease in labour shares, controlling for other
sources of capital augmenting technological growth.65 Finally, Arpaia et al. adapt
an approach combining modelling and calibration where technology strikes out as
the winning determinant.66
Common in social scientific work, the evidence connecting technology and factor
shares is not unanimous. For example, running panel regressions with a dataset in-
cluding 89 countries in total, Guerriero and Sen find actually a positive correlation
between technological change and labour share. Their proxies are, however, deviant
from the ones introduced above: number of patent applications and R&D expendi-
ture, to be precise. Interestingly, Guerriero and Sen discover a negative effect for
mechanisation, measured as the proportion of machinery and equipment capital of
the overall capital stock.67 Another contradictive finding is represented by Harrison.
With a dataset resembling Guerriero and Sen’s in width, only older, she reports a
negative relation between labour-capital ratio and labour share, implicating equiv-
alently a positive relation between capital-labour ratio and labour share.68
Additionally, Stockhammer has strongly criticized the proxies and methodology used
in verifying the effect of technological change. According to Stockhammer, without
controlling for time fixed effects the regression coefficients on technology variables
become biased. Also, proxying technological change with a time trend is reprehen-
sible.69 In a later article Stockhammer, however, finds a significant negative effect of
capital-labour ratio to labour share.70 For a summarisation, the majority of evidence
suggest that technological change has both economically and statistically significant
63Bassanini and Manfredi 2012, pp. 11–13, 35.
64Understanding the Downward Trend in Labor Income Shares 2017, pp. 136, 161.
65Karabarbounis and Neiman 2013, abstract.
66Arpaia, Pe´rez, and Pichelmann 2009, pp. 27–28, 35.
67Guerriero and Sen n.d.
68Harrison 2005, pp. 4, 22–23.
69Stockhammer 2009, pp. 11, 42.
70Stockhammer 2013, pp. 42–43.
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negative effect on labour share. However, the sign of the effect may variate, de-
pending on whether the technical progress happens on areas clearly signified by the
exploitation of raw labour. Moreover, the net effect of technological advancement
might turn blurry, if the dataset covers great number of developing economies alike.
Globalisation places second when comparing the most important driver of factor
shares among earlier research. Its effect is typically established through negative
regression coefficient for trade share or trade openness, which is the sum of im-
ports and exports divided by GDP. For example, Harrison finds trade share the
most plausible candidate behind the fall in labour shares.71 Stockhammer uses the
same variable definition and comes up with an identical conclusion.72 EC reports
a similar negative impact for trade share, too, although its magnitude is overshad-
owed by technological progress.73 Guerriero and Sen find openness’ effect negative
in developed countries.74
With slightly altering definitions and approaches the conclusion of trade’s nega-
tive effect seems to maintain robustness. Bo¨ckerman and Maliranta study trade’s
impact, defined as exports-output ratio, with firm-level data in Finland and find
it explaining about a third of the fall in labour share from the 1970s onwards.75
Jaumotte and Tytell proxy globalisation with the relative prices of exports and im-
ports and report results that are in line with the ones above.76 Elsby et al. take
an interesting angle, defining globalisation as the percentage difference between to-
tal domestic requirements and total requirements per industry, again with familiar,
negative outcome.77
Considering financialisation I have only found two exemplary articles. Stockhammer
argues strongly that financialisation is a great but underrepresented determinant of
factor shares. Trying to capture its essence with the ratio of external assets and
liabilities to GDP he finds a negative effect.78 IMF proceed with an identical proxy
71Harrison 2005, p. 5.
72Stockhammer 2009, p. 39.
73The Labour Income Share in the European Union 2007, p. 258.
74Guerriero and Sen n.d., p. 26.
75Bo¨ckerman and Mika Maliranta 2012, pp. 268, 277.
76Jaumotte and Tytell 2007, pp. 171–172.
77Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin 2013, pp. 41–42, 47.
78Stockhammer 2013, pp. 19, 32–33.
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variable and discover a negative impact alike, concerning, however, only advanced
economies.79
Reflecting against the theoretical attention, union power’s effect on factor shares
has appeared mysteriously non-existent in previous research. Since it is typically
proxied with numerous variables, the blame cannot be put solely on measurement
problems, either. Bengtsson argues strongly for the importance of union power, but
union density comes out insignificant in his time series analysis on Swedish data.80
In Stockhammer’s work union density’s impact is positive ”rather consistently”,
but its robustness lingers on model specification.81 In a later article Stockhammer
finds the relation between labour market institutions and labour share statistically
insignificant.82
Somewhat newer to the field, increase in monopoly power has proved to be a po-
tential candidate behind declining labour shares in rich countries. Barkai attracted
certainly some fresh attention by claiming that increase in market concentration,
measured with the market share of n largest firms per industry, could explain the
decrease in labour share in the U.S. by itself.83 Autor et al. estimate a comparable re-
gression and document an analogous impact, but do not draw as bold conclusions.84
In another occasion, Autor et al. discover additional evidence of the universal na-
ture of the negative correlation between monopoly power and labour share with a
multinational firm-level dataset.85 Hutchinson and Persyn report a modest, nega-
tive effect of an increase in concentration ratio to labour share in European Union
member countries.86 As a final example of empirical evidence, Azmat et al. identify
a reverse correlation between barriers to entry and labour share. The idea is that
restrictions to free market entrance strengthen the market power of those taking
cover behind the barriers.87
79Understanding the Downward Trend in Labor Income Shares 2017, pp. 135–136.
80Bengtsson 2014, pp. 292, 309.
81Stockhammer 2009, p. 53.
82Stockhammer 2013, p. 31.
83Barkai 2016, pp. 24–25.
84D. Autor, Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, et al. 2017, p. 5.
85D. Autor, Dorn, F. Katz, et al. 2017, pp. 25, 47.
86Hutchinson and Persyn 2012, p. 35.
87Azmat, Manning, and Reenen 2007, pp. 21–23.
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Diverging from the mainstream framework of panel regressions, Ripatti and Vil-
munen combine modelling and time series econometrics, and conclude that the fall
in labour share in Finland during the 1990s is most likely due to an increase in
mark-ups. They suspect, however, that the growing mark-ups have been caused
by product differentiation and increasing returns to scale rather than monopoly
power.88
Completely different viewpoints, outside the classical theoretical explanations, have
also been put forward. Considering the Finnish experience, the significance of struc-
tural change behind the aggregate level changes in labour share has been highlighted
by Kyyra¨ and Maliranta. The essential catch is that while different industries with
differing levels of labour share either grow or contract in terms of total value added,
the aggregate labour share variates, even though the labour shares within industries
remains constant. The same goes within industries, too, as heterogenous firms are
established and shut down.89 In contrast, Sauramo emphasizes the role of unem-
ployment and rising mark-ups behind the decline in Finnish labour share over the
1990s.90
In a broader context, another relatively common explanation for changes in factor
shares, also neglected by theory, is politics. For example, Harrison suggests that an
increase in government intervention pushes labour share up. She finds a positive
regression coefficient for government spending as a share of GDP in panel regres-
sions covering 100 countries.91 Stockhammer makes a similar discovery, although
noting that the magnitude is minor compared to globalisation.92 In his long-term
examination, Piketty puts the biggest weight on politics, as well.93
The last controversial yet interesting proposition is offered by Rognlie, who questions
the popular opinion about capital augmenting technological change, claiming that
diminishing labour share is not a consequence of capital accumulation, but rather
capital scarcity instead. He argues that the rising capital share emerges from housing
88Ripatti and Vilmunen 2001, pp. 35–37.
89See Kyyra¨ 2002, p. 7 and Kyyra¨ and Mika Maliranta 2006, pp. 18–22
90Pekka Sauramo 2003, p. 41.
91Harrison 2005, pp. 4, 26–28.
92Stockhammer 2013, pp. 11, 32–33.
93Piketty 2016, p. 214.
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capital, not productive capital, and is labelled with stagnant or shrinking capital
stock along with excessively growing capital price.94 This is a very different scenario
compared to the traditional technology story, and if correct, it should move the focus
of functional income distribution research from labour to housing market.
94Rognlie 2015, pp. 2, 48.
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4 The extended neoclassical model
In order to enhance understanding of the mechanisms behind the empirical results,
in this chapter I introduce the widely popular neoclassical model, extended with
market imperfections. The model here was first presented in EC 2007, and my
contribution lies in minor simplifications.95
I start with the familiar formulation of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
production function:
Q =
[
α(AL)−ρ + (1− α)(BK)−ρ
]− 1
ρ (5)
where α is a distribution parameter, ρ is a substitution parameter, and A and B
represent the respective productive efficiencies. I.e. as A increases, the use of labour
becomes more efficient, or alternatively, labour is saved. In addition, ρ and α satisfy
the conditions −1 < ρ < ∞ and 0 < α < 1. Next, to ease interpretation later on,
I derive an expression for the elasticity of substitution. By definition, elasticity of
substitution is formulated as:
σ =
d(K/L)
K/L
d(MPL/MPK)
MPL/MPK
=
d ln
(
K
L
)
d ln
(
MPL
MPK
) (6)
where MPL = ∂Q
∂L
is the marginal productivity of labour and MPK = ∂Q
∂K
is the
marginal productivity of capital. To tackle the quest at hand, I compute the first-
order conditions for equation (5):
∂Q
∂L
= αA−ρ
(
Q
L
)1+ρ
∂Q
∂K
= (1− α)B−ρ
(
Q
K
)1+ρ (7)
Next, after a few manipulations which I have left for the Appendix, I end up with
95The Labour Income Share in the European Union 2007, p. 264.
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the wanted elasticity:
∂ ln
(
K
L
)
∂ ln
(
MPL
MPK
) = 11 + ρ = σ (8)
This implies equivalently, that ρ = 1−σ
σ
.
Given the expression for ρ, I can start to derive more informative formulations for
both factor shares. Assuming that firms maximize profits, it is known that:
∂Q
∂L
= MPL = W
P
∂Q
∂K
= MPK = R
P
(9)
where W
P
, R
P
represent the real prices of both inputs.
Now, using (7), (8) and (9), labour and capital share can be expressed as:
LS = α
(
Q
AL
) 1−σ
σ
CS = (1− α)
(
Q
BK
) 1−σ
σ
(10)
According to equation (10), the relation between labour productivity, labour saving
technology and labour share depends on the elasticity of substitution. Analogically,
the relation between capital productivity, capital saving technology and capital share
is determined by the elasticity.
Now, rewriting labour share in terms of K
L
allows us to examine how capital accu-
mulation affects the labour share. Skipping again the details, the partial derivative
of interest is:
∂LS
∂
(
K
L
) = (1− σ
σ
)
α (1− α)
(
Q
AL
)2( 1−σσ ) (BK
AL
)−( 1−σσ ) (K
L
)−1
⇒

∂LS
∂(KL )
< 0, when σ > 1
∂LS
∂(KL )
> 0, when σ < 1
(11)
Where the implication in the end follows from the fact that all the other terms are
24
necessarily positive except for 1−σ
σ
. The conclusion from equation (11) is that an
increase in capital accumulation, K
L
, decreases labour share when the elasticity of
substitution is above unity. It has the opposite effect when the elasticity is below
unity.
Similarly, I can examine the effect of labour saving technology on labour share:
∂LS
∂A
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)
α (1− α)
(
Q
AL
)2( 1−σσ ) (BK
AL
)− 1−σ
σ
A−1
⇒

∂LS
∂A
> 0, if σ > 1
∂LS
∂A
< 0, if σ < 1
(12)
The above implies that an increase in labour saving technology increases labour share
in case the elasticity of substitution is greater than one. The opposite happens when
the elasticity is below one.
Next, I introduce the more plausible scenario, which accounts for imperfect compe-
tition. Suppose that there exist mark-ups, pi, in the product markets, such that
∂Q
∂L
= MPL = piW
P
∂Q
∂K
= MPK = piR
P
where pi > 1.
Now, factor shares can be rewritten as:
LS = W
P
L
Q
= W
(
∂Q
∂L
)
piW
L
Q
= 1
pi
(
∂Q
∂L
)
L
Q
= 1
pi
α
(
Q
AL
) 1−σ
σ
CS = 1
pi
(1− α)
(
Q
BK
) 1−σ
σ
(13)
Equation (13) suggests that an increase in mark-up squeezes both labour and capital
shares. For labour share, I derive also the partial derivative:
∂LS
∂pi
= − α
pi2
(
Q
AL
) 1−σ
σ
(14)
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Which asserts the negative correlation.
Finally, considering market imperfections in labour markets as well, I introduce
the possibility of wage bargaining. Suppose real wage is determined as a weighted
average:
W
P
= γQ
L
+ (1− γ)Wr
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a measure of bargaining power of employees. When employers
can single-handedly dictate labour market conditions, meaning γ = 0, the real wage
equals some reservation wage W
P
= Wr. On the other hand, if unions dominate
the negotiation process, implying γ = 1, all the gains from increases in labour
productivity accrue to wages, equivalently W
P
= Q
L
.
Taking account wage bargaining, labour share takes the following form:
LS = W
P
L
Q
=
(
γ
Q
L
+ (1− γ)Wr
)
L
Q
= γ + (1− γ)Wr L
Q
⇒
LS = 1, if γ = 1LS = Wr (LQ) , if γ = 0
(15)
Translated to words, equation (15) implies that the greater the bargaining power of
unions, the closer the labour share is to one (or 100%, when speaking in percentages).
All in all, the selected model provides four important lessons for the mechanisms
determining the labour share. These can be read from equations (11), (12), (14)
and (15), and for convenience I offer a brief summary. The relation between capital-
labour ratio, labour-saving technology and the labour share is tied to the elasticity of
substitution. If the elasticity is below unity, an increase in the former has a positive
effect on labour share, while the latter’s impact is negative. In case the elasticity is
above unity, the exact opposite applies. In comparison, accumulation of monopoly
power always decreases labour share, while accumulation of bargaining power works
the other way. In the empirical section, I show that the complete model can explain
the patterns of Finnish labour share in industry during the last hundred years quite
coherently.
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5 Methods
I use linear regression as my principal method to examine the relationships between
labour share and its suggested determinants. Linear regression is a conventional way
to approximate a linear connection between variables. It is based on the calculation
of best linear fit through minimizing the sum of squared differences between the
observed and fitted values, or i.e. the sum of squared residuals.
A crucial assumption considering regression based on observables is, that the error
term is uncorrelated with the independent variables, stated formally as E (|X) = 0.
In social sciences, this assumption is often violated, since the determinants re-
searchers are interested in are rarely randomly assigned. Consequently, the regres-
sion coefficients turn out biased.
Instead of the simplest cross-sectional regression, the core of my analysis is based
on another regression technique including also time dimension, called the fixed ef-
fects -regression or shortly FE. FE has certain advantages over a cross-sectional
setting: instead of relying on controlling all the relevant determinants, FE con-
trols for time-invariant entity-specific variables and time-varying common shocks
by construction.96 This allows me to focus on controlling merely time-varying and
entity-specific variables. Formally, FE-model can be expressed as:
Yit = γi + λt + βXit + it,
where Y is the dependent and X is the independent variable. γi captures the entity-
fixed effects and λt the time-fixed effects. Informatively, the above turns out to be
algebraically the same as:
Yit − Y¯i = (γi − γ¯i) + (λt − λ¯) + β(Xit − X¯i) + (it − ¯i)
Where γi− γ¯i = 0, since the average over a constant is equal to the constant itself97,
meaning that the entity-fixed effects are effectively eliminated. Moreover, λt − λ¯
96Stock and Watson 2015, p. 396.
97Here, γ¯i = 1T
∑T
t=1 γi = γi.
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captures the impact of common shocks, ergo time fixed effects.98
5.1 Econometric models
I begin my analysis at the most aggregate level, examining time series for industry
as a whole. My time series model takes the following form:
∆ lnALSt = β0 + β1∆ ln densityt + β2∆ ln
(
K
L
)
t
+ β3∆TFPt
+ β4∆ ln
(
trade
GDP
)
t
+ β5∆ ln
(
A&D
GDP
)
t
+ β6∆ ln
(
exp
GDP
)
t
+ β7∆ lnNXt + t,
(16)
where ALS is the adjusted labour share, density is the union density, K
L
is the real
capital stock per employee, TFP is the total factor productivity, trade
GDP
is the ratio of
imports plus exports to GDP, A&D
GDP
is the ratio of foreign assets and debts to GDP,
exp
GDP
is the ratio of public expenditure to GDP, and NX is the nominal exchange
rate.
The aggregate approach has itself some clear advantages: it allows me to study the
impact of certain variables that vary only at the level of the whole economy. In
equation (16) these would be the last three, namely nominal exchange rate, public
expenditure and foreign assets and debts. Considering the earlier literature around
the determinants of labour share in Finland, especially the first is of great interest.
In several occasions, devaluations are named as if not the principal, at least a major
driver of the labour share in Finnish economy.99
To relax the possibility of spurious regression in time series analysis caused by au-
tocorrelating variables, I follow the conventional precaution of working with the
first differences of logarithmic variables.100 While taking logarithms makes the error
terms more likely to follow a normal distribution, first differencing terminates the
98Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 223; Stock and Watson 2015, pp. 406–408; Wooldridge 2016,
pp. 435–438.
99See for example Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 1993.
100Except for TFP, which is expressed as the usual growth rate in decimal form.
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autocorrelation of variables with unit roots.101
In order to take advantage of a cross-sectional dimension, I use panel data of 11
industrial branches. The baseline panel regressions in my analysis can be formally
expressed as:
lnALSit = β0 + γi + λt + β1 ln densityit + β2 ln
(
K
L
)
it
+β3∆TFPit + β4 ln
(
trade
GV A
)
it
+ it (17)
lnALSit = β0 + γi + λt + β1 ln densityit + β2 ln
(
K
L
)
it
+β3∆TFPit + β4 ln
(
M
GV A
)
it
+ β5 ln
(
X
GV A
)
it
+ it (18)
In specifications (17) and (18), the independent variables are familiar picks in previ-
ous literature, but also consistent with my theoretical model. While capital-labour
ratio appears in the model itself, TFP is meant to capture the effect of labour ef-
ficiency, referring to parameter A. Union density aims to represent the bargaining
power of labour, and its theoretical counterpart is the model parameter γ. Trade
can plausibly work through two channels: if its effect on product markets is dom-
inating, trade can be seen as diminishing the mark-up parameter pi, resulting in
growing labour share. In case trade’s impact works mainly through labour markets,
it is squeezing the bargaining power γ, leading to decreasing labour share. In other
words, I expect trade to behave according to the excess profit hypothesis. In chapter
7, I show, why this is a justifiable premise.
In addition to the baseline specifications, I will replicate the regressions using FD-
estimators, working with log differences over five years.102. Using long differences
allows me to encapsulate the long-term effects better, but I will also explore the
more conventional FD-estimators of log differences over a single year. For sensitivity
analysis, I check whether using weighted least squares or including branch-specific
101See e.g. Stock and Watson 2015, p. 607; Greene 2000, pp. 776–778.
102Using long differences or ”low-frequency variation” (D. Autor and Salomons 2018, p. 24) is a
desirable technique, since more often than not the feedback between two variables does not take
place within a 12-month window. For applied examples, see Graetz and Michaels 2018 and D.
Autor and Salomons 2018.
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trends affects the results103, as well as changing the outcome variable from adjusted
labour share to net adjusted labour share or simple wage share. To distinguish
between the underlying mechanisms, I am to disaggregate the outcome variable,
and test how the independent variables affect real wages and gross value added
per se.104 Finally, to ensure that my hypothesis testing is not invalidated by serial
correlation, I rerun the baseline regressions using the recommended Wild cluster
bootstrap standard errors, which are discussed in length in section 5.2.
5.1.1 Estimating the elasticity of substitution
In case the assumption of perfect markets is satisfied, the sign of the correlation
between the labour share and capital-labour ratio reveals whether the elasticity of
substitution, σ, is below or above one. In contrast to majority of previous empirical
work, I am to ease the perfect markets assumption and interpret the coefficient on
capital-labour ratio based on an estimate for the elasticity of substitution.105 For
example, in case the estimated elasticity turns out to be 1, as in Cobb-Douglas
production function, any deviation in K
L
ratio’s coefficient from zero is interpreted a
sign of imperfect competition: negative coefficient implies excess profits, and positive
suggests featherbedding in the labour markets, which means that wage rate is set
above marginal productivity due to pressure from the unions.
While there are multiple ways of deriving an estimate of σ, the most straight-forward
manner is bringing equation (6) to estimable form:
ln
(
w
r
)
it
= β0 + γi + λt + β1 ln
(
K
L
)
it
+ it
where  is an error term. Blanchard, for example, has followed this fashion and
reports an average elasticity of substitution close to one for OECD countries during
103Like Graetz and Michaels 2018, I control for branch-specific trends by adding N − 1 branch
dummies to a long difference model. Since I am using differences, this is sufficient to isolate
branch-specific trends: see Wooldridge 2010, p. 375.
104Angrist and Pischke remark, that disaggregating the dependent variable is one way to test
the causal pathway of interest (Angrist and Pischke 2015, p. 196). For an applied example, see
Acemoglu et al. 2014, pp. 397–399.
105Raurich, Sala, and Sorolla 2012, p. 184.
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1961–1995.106 In Finnish setting, Ripatti and Vilmunen and Jalava et al. apply a
more versatile approach while both report an elasticity estimate around 0.4–0.6 after
WWII.107
Because of the desirable simplicity, I follow Piketty’s method and define the elasticity
of substitution as:
ln rit = β0 + γi + λt + β1 ln
(
K
Y
)
it
+ it (19)
where rit is the rate of return in branch i at period t, and KY it is the capital-output
ratio at market value in branch i at period t.108 Since β1 represents the marginal
effect of
(
K
Y
)
it
on rit, our parameter of interest, the elasticity of substitution, is
simply σ =
∣∣∣ 1
β1
∣∣∣. Like Piketty, I compute the rate of return as:
rit =
CSit
K
Y it
(20)
where capital share comes from CS = 100− ALS and accounts the income of self-
employed by construction.109 Other variables are the same as in equation (19).
5.2 Restrictions and robustness
First of all, it is necessary to point out that the selected methodology provides at best
descriptive evidence about the connection between labour share and the variables in
question. While FE-regression can have a causal interpretation, this requires strong
assumptions which are most likely not satisfied in this application. The critical
assumption is that the dependent variable in treatment and control groups would
have had a similar trend absent the treatment.110 Simply put, treatment and control
groups, here, branches, must work as plausible counterfactuals to each other. At
this level of aggregation, this is most likely a false hope.
106O. J. Blanchard, Nordhaus, and Phelps 1997, pp. 97–99.
107Ripatti and Vilmunen 2001, p. 36; Jalava, Pohjola, et al. 2005, abstract. Furthermore, Pohjola
argues that the elasticity in Finland is probably below one. Pohjola 1995, pp. 559–560.
108Piketty 2016, pp. 199–200.
109Following from the fact that the income of self-employed is included in ALS (see section 3.1).
110Angrist and Pischke 2015, pp. 178–187.
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Another important and distinctive restriction considering FE-models is the so called
pooling restriction. It refers to the implicit assumption that the effect of the inde-
pendent variables to labour share is identical across observation units, or formally,
β = βi. This quite heroic assumption is often ducked by stating that the regression
coefficients must be interpreted as the average impact across heterogenous observa-
tion units, which I emphasize in this study as well.111
Third problem threatening my empirical strategy is the probability of serial cor-
relation, which must be addressed with length. Serial correlation refers to a phe-
nomenon where past shocks show persistence.112 This corrupts the independence of
subsequent observations within clusters: observations appear to be artificially close
to each other, which in most settings makes the corresponding residuals and there-
fore also the standard errors downward biased.113 Consequently, the conventional
hypothesis testing turns invalid.
A general fix to address serial correlation is clustering the standard errors. Clustering
allows serial correlation within clusters and eliminates the problem in a common-
place microeconometric setting.114 However, the setting of this thesis is not exactly
commonplace, since the length of the panel is so long and the width is relatively
small.115 Thus, it is quite likely that clustering will not provide the adequate fix.116
Another more efficient but also costlier way to deal with serial correlation is the
bootstrap standard error. Bootstrap offers an alternative way to compute the stan-
dard errors, when the usual formula is not believed to produce good approximations
of the actual sample variance of the estimator in question. In bootstrapping the
trick is to create a large amount of random pseudosamples from the original sample,
equal in size. Next, an auxiliary OLS estimate, βˆb, is computed for each pseudosam-
111Azmat, Manning, and Reenen 2007. Criticism: Bo¨ckerman and Mika Maliranta 2012. The
interpretation in the end: Stockhammer 2009.
112In practice serial correlation emerges when a time-varying and entity-specific omitted variable
is autocorrelated. If e.g. unemployment rate happened to affect the changes in labour share
within branches, it could cause the residuals to be autocorrelated, given that unemployment rate
is probably an autocorrelated variable. See Stock and Watson 2015, 412–413.
113A Colin Cameron and Douglas L Miller 2015, pp. 6–7; Angrist and Pischke 2009, pp. 315–319.
114Angrist and Pischke 2015, p. 207.
115In relevant literature, this is often referred appropriately as the small N , large T -problem.
116The severity of serial correlation was made known by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004,
who address the problems and solutions in admirable detail.
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ple. The resulting bootstrap standard error, bse(βˆ), is then the sample standard
deviation of these auxiliary OLS estimates. Formally:
bse(βˆ) =
[
(B − 1)−1
B∑
b=1
(βˆb − ¯ˆβ)(βˆb − ¯ˆβ)′
] 1
2
, (21)
where B is the number of pseudosamples.117 The strength of the bootstrap lies in
its ability to take account the unorthodox distribution of data when the empirical
model involves persistent variables.118 In this thesis, I am to use two variations of
bootstrap standard errors: the block bootstrap and the Wild cluster bootstrap.
With the former the idea is the same as with the standard bootstrap introduced
above, but resampling is done over entire clusters – here, branches. In my case,
the Wild cluster bootstrap is otherwise similar to the block bootstrap, except that
instead of resampling over clusters of Yit, it draws clusters of both Yit = X
′
it + eˆit
and X ′it − eˆit with probability 0.5.119 Wild cluster bootstrap has proven to produce
especially reliable standard errors in Monte Carlo settings. Cameron et al. and
Brewer et al. show that using placebo treatments in a test of nominal size 0.05 the
traditional clustered standard error fails to reject the null hypothesis at a rejection
rate over 0.20 with 5 to 10 clusters, while Wild cluster bootstrap achieves a rejection
rate around the optimal 0.05.120
Finally, I discuss two topics that might bias the regression coefficients (instead of
standard errors) themselves, namely simultaneity and omitted variable bias. More
often than not, especially in macroeconomic contexts, there is a possibility that the
variables of interest are in endogenous relation. This implies that there exists reverse
causality or that the variables are determined simultaneously. Considering the mod-
els described above, the most probable candidates suffering from simultaneity are
the capital-labour ratio and union density. With capital-labour ratio the potential
of simultaneity is evident since the number of employees appears in the definition
117In the following analysis, I use 500 pseudosamples whenever bootstrapping is applied.
118Wooldridge 2016, pp. 203–204; Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 300.
119Angrist and Pischke 2009, p. 301; A. Colin Cameron, Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller 2008,
p. 427.
120A. Colin Cameron, Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller 2008, pp. 422–425; Brewer, Crossley, and
Joyce 2018, pp. 6–7. For a thorough discussion on robust inference with few clusters, see A Colin
Cameron and Douglas L Miller 2015.
33
of labour share as well. As for union density, the incentive to join a union is ar-
guably dependent of the position of labour with respect to capital, in another words
the labour share. Simultaneity might bias regression coefficients in FE-models. I
tend the issue merely by using lagged regressors, which at least ease the threat of
simultaneity that takes place instantly.121
Omitted variable bias occurs when a variable Z which is excluded from the regression
is correlated with the treatment variable X and the outcome variable Y , conditional
on covariates. Consequently, the respective regression coefficient, βX , will be biased.
The direction of the bias depends on the signs of the correlations. In case an omit-
ted variable is positively correlated both with the outcome and the treatment, the
regression coefficient is upward biased by definition.122 Judging by the theoretical
model in chapter 4, and previous research, one serious candidate for an omitted vari-
able is monopoly power. For example, Autor et al. argue that a markable increase
in monopoly power in the U.S. during couple past decades goes hand in hand with
technological advancement, i.e. the two are positively correlated.123 While monopoly
power is presumably negatively correlated with the labour share, this would imply
a negative omitted variable bias for the coefficients of K
L
and TFP .
121This is a precaution Bo¨ckerman and Maliranta apply as well. Bo¨ckerman and Mika Maliranta
2012, p. 269.
122Angrist and Pischke 2015, pp. 71–92; Angrist and Pischke 2009, pp. 59–64.
123D. Autor, Dorn, F. Katz, et al. 2017, pp. 23–26.
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6 Data
6.1 Aggregate
For labour share in whole industry, which requires series of GVA, NVA, wage sum,
employers’ social contributions, number of employees and self-employed, my data
is simply aggregated from the eleven branches in the branch-level dataset. Their
sources are described in section 6.2. The aggregated series represent industrial
production perfectly from 1960 onwards, but before that they exclude the relatively
minor rubber and leather industry due to data difficulties. The underlying problems
are addressed in detail in section 6.2.
Speaking of determinants of labour share, technology is proxied with the capital-
labour
(
K
L
)
ratio and total factor productivity (TFP ). Like the variables composing
labour share, capital stock is also aggregated from the branch-level stocks. To
arrive at per capita numbers I divided the capital stock with the employment series
described above. TFP is expressed simply as the Solow residual, A, which is derived
from the Cobb-Douglas production function, written in log differences:
∆ ln Y = ∆ lnA+ α∆ lnK + (1− α)∆ lnL, (22)
where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour, and α and 1−α their respective shares
of total income. Rearranging terms, I get
∆ ln Y = ∆ lnA+ α∆ lnK + ∆ lnL− α∆ lnL
∆ lnA = ∆ ln Y − α∆ lnK −∆ lnL+ α∆ lnL
∆ lnA = ∆ ln Y −∆ lnL− α(∆ lnK −∆ lnL)
∆ lnA = ∆ ln
(
Y
L
)
− α∆ ln
(
K
L
)
(23)
Finally, exploiting the approximation ∆ ln ≈ %∆ where %∆ refers to the usual
growth rate, I end up with
%∆A = %∆
(
Y
L
)
− α%∆
(
K
L
)
(24)
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Now, substituting Y with the real GVA at 2010 constant prices, K with the real
net capital stock at 2010 constant prices, L with the number of employees and α
with the average of capital share in periods t and t− 1, I exploited equation (24) to
acquire series of yearly change in TFP, expressed in percentage points.124
The idea of using capital-labour ratio as a proxy of technological change lies in an
assumption that new capital always embodies some technological advancement. This
is intuitive, if one were to think of new machinery and equipment: they certainly are
acquired with hopes of upgrading production technology. Strictly speaking, capital-
labour ratio is meant to capture how well labour can be substituted with capital, as
explained in section 2.2. In contrast, total factor productivity pursues to measure
technological improvement while keeping capital and labour input constant, and as
such it works as an indicator for changes in input efficiency. Since I am presuming
that TFP works as a valid indicator for labour-saving technological change, I am
hoping that it could pin down exactly how good is the upgraded technology at saving
work effort, frankly, automating it.
Considering my study, the long time period sets some unavoidable restrictions on
the choice of indicator variables. Technological change cannot be proxied with ICT
capital at the beginning of the 20th century for obvious reasons. Series on R&D
investment might be feasible, but are very hard to come by. Fortunately, K
L
ratio
and TFP are among the two of the most common measures for technological change
in my line of research and possible to compute based on sufficiently reliable sources.
Essentially, in a research period of 100 years, the indicator variables need to have
a sensible interpretation regardless of the evolution of time and massive changes in
the means of production.
As an indicator of state intervention I decided to use public spending as a share
of GDP. Until 1974 public spending is acquired from Hjerppe and from 1975 to
2015 from the modern national accounts (NA 1975–2015).125 Here, no linking has
been conducted. Public spending is meant to catch, for example, whether statutory
changes in employers’ social contributions can affect the labour share. It works
also indirect ways: widening the social network of welfare state, by e.g. increasing
124For the derivation of equation (24), see e.g. Pohjola 1996, p. 75.
125Riitta Hjerppe 1988a; Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) n.d.(d).
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unemployment benefits, should appear as an upward push in public spending. While
this makes the outside-option of working more attractive, it might decrease the
supply of labour and via that increase the reservation wage.126
To measure globalisation I use the traditional trade share and a little more uncom-
mon variable, the value of external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP. For trade
share, expressed simply as imports+exports
GDP
× 100, I have data only for the imports and
exports of goods, which of course oversees a vital part of trade, the services. The
variable is constituted as a weighted average of import and export exposures by
branch. A detailed description of the included branches is available upon request.
External assets and liabilities are somewhat trickier to collect and consequently come
from various sources. From 1890 to 1913 the data is provided in Ba¨rlund,127 and
from 1914 to 1939 in Lappalainen.128 For the war years I have used the crude esti-
mates in Ba¨rlund and Ba¨rlund, along with partial linear interpolation in 1941–1943
and 1945–1949.129 In 1950–1974 I have used the series in Airikkala & Sukselainen,
and in 1975–1992 the series in Kariluoto.130 Finally, the years 1993–2001 and 2002–
2006 are from Finland’s balance of payments, and the remaining years from 2007 to
2015 from Statistics Finland’s financial accounts.131
After addressing technological change, my choices of indicator variables are relatively
straight-forward. In order to indicate the impact of globalisation, trade share is
single-handedly the most common proxy among related empirical work. The value
of imports and exports are also relatively easy to access, both on aggregate and
branch level, and are constructed with commendably uniform sources and methods.
The idea behind external assets and debts is to provide a measure of capital mobility,
in contrast with the circulation of goods: while the stock of non-domestic assets and
debts grows, this can be seen as a signal of cross-border capital movement.
The last dimension of labour share determinants, bargaining power, I proxy with
union density and strike activity. From 1907 to 1992 the former is computed as
126Labour Losing to Capital: What Explains the Declining Labour Share? 2012, p. 144.
127Ba¨rlund et al. 1992.
128Lappalainen 1997.
129Ba¨rlund 1945; Ba¨rlund 1951.
130Airikkala and Sukselainen 1976; Kariluoto 1996.
131Bank of Finland 2003; Bank of Finland 2007; Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) n.d.(a).
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a weighted average of respective union densities by branch. After 1992, however,
the mergers of a few key unions make the aggregation on the basis of industrial
breakdown practically impossible, and therefore the union density for whole industry
is approximated with the changes in union density in food etc., paper and metal
industry. Working days lost due strikes from 1909 to 2015 is a simple aggregated sum
from the branches in the branch-level dataset. The raw series is made comparable
over time by expressing it as strike days per thousand employees.
Considering the bargaining power of employees, union density is a natural choice.
It is popular in applied work and possible to collect from a long time span based
on reliable materials. The justification is simple: while increasing part of employees
acquire union membership, their guardian of interest, the union, grows more power-
ful. The union can combine the fragmented voices of single employees and organize
them, for example, to strikes, which makes a bigger union a more notable actor for
employers, enhancing their bargaining position. Strike activity mirrors the bargain-
ing positions similarly working as a threat for employers and giving the employees
leverage in wage bargaining.
On top of the classical theory explanations, it is necessary to contemplate about the
idiosyncratic features of Finland as a case. After WWII, the regular devaluation
of markka on every ten years or so came to be known as a quick fix to restore
the profitability of export industries, and at the same time fix the distribution of
income to “normal levels”, ergo depress the labour share. This cyclicality in the
nominal exchange rate, inflation and functional income distribution was titled by
the contemporaries as the devaluation cycle. I attempt to capture the impact of
devaluations with the nominal effective exchange rate, which is collected from two
different sources: for years 1862–1990 the data is from Autio,132 and from then on
from Eurostat. Eurostat’s series are constructed on the basis of 24 trading partners
from 1990 to 1993 and of 42 trading partners from 1994 to 2015.133
132Autio 1992, p. 236.
133Eurostat 2017.
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6.2 By branch
Disaggregated data by branch is a much scarcer resource than the data considering
the whole economy. Nonetheless, it is necessary to bring the examination at branch
level, since averaging and aggregation waste valuable information. In this thesis, I
study labour share determinants with and unbalanced panel dataset of 11 branches
practicing industrial activities for maximum of 156 years. Missing values in different
variables materialize so that I have around 400 to 1300 observations in my analysis,
depending on specification. I decided to focus on industrial branches as observation
units because of relatively the best data quality and availability. Needless to say,
this places some considerable restrictions on the external validity of my results.
For any data series which pursue to cover longer time periods, classification problems
arise. For a period as long as 100 years my data fitting difficulties have been relatively
secondary. As an initial framework I have exploited the industrial classification
used in the first Growth study.134 To begin with, I decided to leave leather and
rubber industry out of my examination because of the inconsistencies caused by
classification reforms. Therefore, leather industry joins in 1960 with the textile
industry and the rubber industry tags along with the chemical industry.
As the primary data source in my panel, I use Bank of Finland’s Growth studies.
They cover the most constitutive series of gross value added (GVA), wage sums and
employment from 1860 to 1959. From then on I use the data in National accounts.
Timeseries for 1960–1981 (NA 1960–1981) from 1960 to 1974, and the modern NA
from 1975 to 2015.135
Considering globalisation and bargaining power, my branch-level data sources are
the following: The value of exports and imports in 1860–1949 comes from the Growth
studies,136 in 1950–2001 from various volumes of foreign trade statistics (FTS),137
and in 2002–2015 from the Uljas database. The value of exports was kindly provided
by Kasperi Lavikainen.138 The number of union members for union density I have
134Reino Hjerppe et al. 1976, p. 21.
135Heikkinen and Riitta Hjerppe 1986; Reino Hjerppe et al. 1976; Official Statistics of Finland
(OSF) 1984; Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) n.d.(d).
136Pihkala 1969; Oksanen and Pihkala 1975.
137Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) n.d.(b).
138Exported goods have been assigned to the eleven branches following the solutions made by
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collected from Yli-Pietila¨ in 1907–1988 and from Statistical Yearbook of Finland then
on, except for the gap in data in 1989 which has been linearly interpolated.139 Strike
activity, measured here as strike days per thousand employees, is from Statistical
Yearbook of Finland for years 1909–2015.140
Proxies for technological change by branch have required the biggest effort in my
data collecting process. While next to impossible to measure per se, indicators of
technological change in historical data are not plentiful to say the least. Root of the
problem is that branch-level series of real capital stock do not exist. To overcome
this shortage I have constructed real net capital stock series for all 11 branches in
my panel dataset from 1900 to 2015.
The capital stock series are composed of three different volume series. The last two
are picked out from data provided by statistical officials in Capital stock in Finland
1960–1981 (CSF 1960–1981) and the latest NA, spanning from 1960 to 1974 and
1975 to 2015, respectively.141 The earliest volume series for the whole industry are
computed using the sum of real net capital stocks in mining, manufacturing and
energy industries in Tiainen.142
Note, that Tiainen provides capital stock series only for the whole industry. Next,
it had to be assigned for eleven different branches, where my modest effort stepped
in. I exploited the data of fixed assets by branch in industrial statistics for 1954–
1959, the records of taxable wealth by branch in statistics of income and property
for 1920–1952, and the indices of installed power by branch in Growth studies for
1900–1919.143 My strategy was the following: I prioritized the data considering the
statistic officials. With regards to imports, only raw materials and accessories have been categorized
to different branches in Pihkala 1969, Oksanen and Pihkala 1975 and Foreign trade statistics until
1997, i.e. investment goods were classified separately. From 1997 to 2015, investment has been
included in the branch-level breakdown, as well (Foreign trade statistics 1998, Volume III, Tables
6a and 7). I have categorized two major subclasses of investment goods, namely machinery and
apparatus and transport equipment excluding tractors, as imports of metal industry during 1860–
1997.
139Yli-Pietila¨ 1990, p. 62; yearly editions of Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1989–2015. The
details on assigning unions to different industrial branches are available upon request.
140Yearly editions of Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1909–2015.
141Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) 1988; Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) n.d.(d).
142Tiainen 1994.
143Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) n.d.(c); Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) n.d.(e); Heikki-
nen and Riitta Hjerppe 1986; Reino Hjerppe et al. 1976.
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whole industry and used the above-mentioned sources just to define each branch’s
proportion of the total capital stock. The latter was done by taking the level of real
net capital stock in CSF 1960–1981 for year 1960 as given, and then extrapolating
this first with the records on industrials statistics, second with the numbers on
statistics of income and property, and finally with the data in Growth Studies. I
addressed the gaps in tax records with linear interpolation, for which the details are
available upon request. Formally, each branch’s proportion of the total capital stock
per annum can be expressed as:
K̂Ni,t∑11
i=1 K̂
N
i,t
,
where K̂Ni,t is the real net capital stock in branch i in year t, and the hats symbolize
that the values are extrapolations.
The step-by-step composition of my branch-level capital series underwent as follows:
first, I constructed a volume series of net capital stock in 1900–1960 for the whole
industry by extrapolating backwards the real net capital stock according to CSF
1960–1986 in 1960 using Tianen’s series. Second, I assigned this industry-level series
for the eleven branches by multiplying it with each branch’s respective proportion,
K̂Ni,t∑11
i=1 K̂
N
i,t
. Third, I formed volume indices of the branch-level series and linked them
to volume indices in 1960–1975 and 1975–2015 based on CSF 1980–1981 and NA
1975–2015. Finally, I set the base year of the linked branch-level indices to 2010,
and created capital stock series at constant 2010 euros through multiplying the
nominal value of real net capital stock in 2010 annually by 100
linked indext
. The result
was branch-level series of net capital stock at 2010 constant euros from 1900 to 2015.
Fortunately, the industrial classification used in industrial statistics and tax records
is easily adjustable to the classification I am using, which is presented in the Growth
studies. There is one exception, however, which is mining and quarrying. The
tax records do not include taxable wealth for mining and quarrying before 1942,
and consequently I have proxied its capital stock’s development with the surplus
branch in statistics of income and property from 1924 to 1942, which is tar, oil and
rubber industry. The only resemblance with the two is tar manufacturing, which is
included in mining and quarrying in Growth Studies, but other than that the two
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depicture quite different activities. Regardless of this, I am hoping that the trends
are relatively similar.
Common to historical materials, in this case likewise, the further we go back in time
the more unreliable data becomes. While the unmanipulated data of fixed assets in
industrial statistics matches the records in CSF 1960–1981 quite well, considering
tax records, the match is ultimately poorer.144 The capital data in Growth studies is
merely a measure of the amount of power the branch is exploiting, and thus, pictures
the trend development of machinery and equipment at best, excluding industrial and
other buildings. To summarize, the quality of my capital stock series deteriorates
first in 1953 and second in 1920.
In an attempt to disentangle my independent variable in parts, I have also collected
volume series of GVA. Volume of GVA in 1900–1959 is from Growth studies, in
1960–1974 from the NA 1960–1981, and in 1975–2015 from the modern NA. By
applying the value and volume series for output and labour, I constructed a series of
real unit labour costs. First, unit labour costs are acquired by dividing the labour
costs, wages plus employers’ social contributions, with labour input. As an indicator
of labour input I used the number of wage earners in 1860–1959, and from then on
the number of wage earners’ working hours. Second, I simply deflated labour costs
with the implicit GVA price index, which is itself computed as the ratio of value
and volume indices.145
Finally, in order to define capital-output ratio at market value, I used gross capi-
tal stock at current prices and GVA series from NA 1960–1981 and NA 1975–2015
from 1960 to 2015. Lacking older branch-level series of nominal gross capital stock,
I extrapolated market valued capital-output ratio with a fixed priced proxy in
1900–1959, assuming that their development would be roughly similar. The latter I
constructed using series of real net capital stock and real GVA described above.
144While the stock of fixed assets in industrial statistics equals 110,7% of the net capital stock
in CFS 1960–1981 in 1960 for whole industry, the stock of taxable wealth in statistics of income
and property amounts merely 40,5% of the stock of fixed assets in 1954. However, the stock of
taxable wealth is measured in 1952 while the stock of fixed assets is from 1954, which introduces
some bias to this comparison.
145Vattula 1980, pp. 13–14.
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7 Analysis
7.1 Historical context and descriptive statistics
In this section, I will provide a parsimonious historical summary of the development
of Finnish industry during the long twentieth century, relying on previous research
and some descriptive statistics of my own data. I argue that despite my analysis
cannot encompass the 19th century due to data limitations, extending the historical
overview is well-grounded for better understanding of the starting point. By and
large, the history of Finnish industry has been a massive success story in terms of
economic growth, which is illustratively exemplified by the fact that after a rela-
tively late initiation of industrialisation in around 1860s, industry’s average labour
productivity surpassed the level of the technological leader, the U.S., in 1996.146
According to Hjerppe and Jalava, Finnish industry’s most valuable assets have been
a relative abundance in hydro power, forest resources and the surplus labour from
agriculture.147
According to a common expression, Finland lives and breaths through her forests.
While this is an exceptionally accurate simplification, it is somewhat inferior de-
scription of Finnish industry at the tails of the long 20th century. In the 1860s, the
most important industrial branches in Finland were metal and textile industry in
terms of shares in total gross value added, displayed in Figure 2.148 Thereafter, paper
and wood industry increased their relative weight, which they managed to maintain
until WWII. The period around 1880 to 1930 was undoubtedly lumber industry’s
heyday, and considering exports the leadership lasted a lot longer. For the next
four decades following WWII, both metal and lumber industry’s GVA share was
relatively stable, until in the 1980s metal industry finally took off, establishing its
position as the biggest industrial branch: in 2015, metal industry covered over 40%
of the total value added. The role of textile industry was to shrink in relative terms
more or less continuously since the 1860s, while the gradual reduction of lumber
industry began in the 1980s.
146Jalava, Heikkinen, and Riitta Hjerppe 2002, p. 5.
147Riitta Hjerppe and Jalava 2006, p. 35.
148Heikkinen and Riitta Hjerppe 1986, p. 33.
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Figure 2: GVA share in selected industries 1860–2015, % of total
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Notes: The GVA share of lumber industry is the sum of the respective shares in wood and paper
industry, while the GVA share of the surplus category ”other” is the sum of GVA shares in all the
other branches, namely mining, food etc., printing, chemical, non-metallic mineral, miscellaneous
and energy industries.
Sources: Heikkinen & Hjerppe 1986; Hjerppe et al. 1976; NA 1960–1981; NA 1975–2015.
Despite lumber industry’s decreasing importance in the more recent past, it rather
unambiguously kickstarted the Finnish industrialisation process. A crucial milestone
was allowing the use of steam power in saw mills in 1857 – steam was adapted quickly,
and became the most important energy source in saw mills already in the 1870s.149
The next major improvement in efficiency was the eletrification of Finnish industry
during the first half of the 20th century. The change’s radical nature becomes clear
when looking at eletricity’s share of total motive power in industry, which grew from
149Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 64.
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7% to 90% in 1900–1939.150 On top of the gains from electrification, paper industry
experienced numerous technical upgrades during the interwar period, which elevated
it temporarily to the largest industrial branch in the 1930s.151
The supply shock brought about by the war, reparations and a subsequent boom
in Soviet trade was a breaking point in the competition between lumber and metal
industry considering the race for the leading industrial branch.152 The shock also
nudged metal industry towards heavier production. Another trajectory spurring
heavier production was the increasing extent of value added in lumber industry,
which boosted the demand for machinery.153 From then on, metal industry began
to concentrate more on investment and intermediate goods.154 The transformation
was partly sustained by the so called capital fundamentalism doctrine, a dominating
philosophy of Finnish growth policy at least in the 1950s and the 1960s, which aimed
to achieve a high investment rate via aggressive saving. The doctrine was succesful:
according to Pohjola, the investment rate in Finland was the highest in the world
during 1960–1990.155 Kiander and Vartia argue, that the investment-led growth
strategy goes roughly hand in hand with president Urho Kekkonen’s reign in 1956–
1981. The president was a vocal proponent of the doctrine himself, and the centre-
left coalition governments of his time willingly maintained the corporatist system,
which ensured the doctrine’s continuity.156 Corporatism refers to the tripartite co-
operation with the central organisations of both employers and employees and the
state.
In the 1990s, the catch-up process of Finnish economy ran out of gas, timely por-
trayed by a heavy recession. Pohjola argues that the recession was actually an
inevitable consequence of the excess capacity, a byproduct of the capital fundamen-
talism of the preceding decades.157 The user cost of capital was conciously weighted
down by policy, which led to overinvestment and labour hoarding.158 Kyyra¨ and
150Jalava 2007, p. 123.
151Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, pp. 224–245.
152Ibid., pp. 319, 408.
153Ibid., p. 430.
154Ibid., pp. 421–422.
155Pohjola 1996, pp. 14, 113.
156Kiander and Vartia 1998, pp. 276–278.
157Pohjola 1996, pp. 124–126.
158Kiander and Vartia 1998, pp. 23, 288–310.
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Maliranta show that over the recession the most profitable firms – characterised
by low labour shares – managed to increase their market shares, while the least
profitable had to exit the market.159 As such, Kyyra¨ & Maliranta’s findings com-
plement Pohjola’s narrative of ”excess capacity”, which was purged in a process of
creative destruction. All the same, the break of the 1990s was labeled with nu-
merous bankruptcies and mergers, demonstrating a necessary shift from extensive
to intensive growth in Finnish industry.160 Another topical feature of the era was
growing exploitation of information and communication technology (ICT), which
offered whole new opportunities to economize working hands.
Next, I delve into industry’s history in more detail, and examine it from the view-
point of each potential determinant of the labour share. In terms of globalisation,
the last 150 years are conventionally periodized into two waves, divided by an autar-
kic interwar era. Like Figure 3 suggests, the periodization applies roughly to Finnish
industry, however, it encompasses more than mere volumes. Considering exports,
the first wave of globalisation was indisputably wood and paper industry’s domina-
tion: combined the two covered the majority of total industrial exports most of the
time, and by WWI the share rose above 80%. Sawmill products ranked as the most
important group among export goods.161 Regarding imports, at the early phases of
industrialisation their composition was more complementary than competitive when
mirrored against domestic production.162 Apart from lumber industry, the other
branches exploited mostly foreign raw materials,163 what was encouraged because
imported raw materials were tariff-free, in contrast to final products.164 Around half
of all imports went to food, beverage and tobacco industries. Import and export
shares by branch are portrayed in Figure B5.
In between the two World Wars, Finnish trade policy turned inward along with
the rest of the world.165 Import tariffs approximately doubled, rising from circa
159Kyyra¨ and Mika Maliranta 2006, pp. 18–19.
160See e.g. Jalava 2007, p. 27 or Jalava, Heikkinen, and Riitta Hjerppe 2002, p. 4.
161Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 64.
162Riitta Hjerppe 1988b, p. 147.
163Heikkinen and Riitta Hjerppe 1986, p. 53.
164Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 84.
165Regarding the Finnish experience, see Oksanen and Pihkala 1975. For a global comparison,
check Eichengreen 1995.
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Figure 3: Exports, imports and external assets and debts 1860–2015, %
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10% to 20% ad valorem in 1913–1938.166 Exports turned more one-sided, as lumber
industry became virtually the only exporter.167 The replacement of sawmill products
by chemical pulp as the main export illustrated the changing hierarchy within lumber
industry in the 1930s. By the 1950s, chemical pulp was overtaken by newsprint.168
During 1945–1957, foreign trade was still rationed and built upon bilateral agree-
ments. The second wave of globalisation began to slowly evolve in the late 1950s
in the form of trade deregulation and stepwise integration, yet it really accelerated
166Riitta Hjerppe 1988b, p. 133.
167Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 229.
168Riitta Hjerppe 1988b, pp. 143–144.
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over the 1990s.169 Important advancements in terms of deregulation include Finefta
in 1961, which made Finland an associate member of the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA),170 as well as a free-trade agreement with the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1974.171 The acceleration of globalisation over the 1990s was
partly due to joining the European Union in 1995, but mainly because of global
factors, such as the foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995,
the liberalisation of the Asian giants, China and India, during the passing decade,
as well as the integration of Eastern Europe to the global economy after the Cold
War.172 Looking at the composition of trade, in exports the share of lumber industry
began to contract fast around the 1960s at the expense of metal industry, and to
lesser extent, chemical industry.173 In 2015, metal industry covered nearly 60% of
total industrial exports, effectively doubling its share in comparison to the 1960s.
Considering imports, the majority was also focused at metal industry. Chemical in-
dustry emerged as another noteworthy import branch over the later half of the 20th
century. Altogether, the bundle of import goods became more competitive as of the
mid-20th century, when trade barriers were abolished and the developing countries
began to specialize in manufacturing products.174
Despite the crucial role of steam in wood industry, it was only the second largest en-
ergy source after hydro power in the whole industry at the eve of WWI.175 Speaking
of technological change, the eletrification of interwar years really catalyzed indus-
trial production. Even now, the period from 1920 to 1938 stands out as an era of
exceptionally rapid growth. It shows in TFP growth rates, displayed in Figure 4,176
as well: in an average branch, TFP grew at a pace of 4.5% per year in 1920–1938,
169Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 370. Note the revision in the classification of
imported and exported goods in 1974, which is responsible for the upward hike in import exposure
in 1970. Foreign trade statistics 1974, Volume II, 10–12.
170Jalava, Heikkinen, and Riitta Hjerppe 2002, p. 9.
171Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 374.
172Haaparanta et al. 2017, pp. 23–24; Freeman 2009, p. 579.
173Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, pp. 376–377.
174In developing countries, the proportion of manufacturing goods of total exports increased from
10% to 65% in the latter half of the 20th century. See Findlay and O’Rourke 2009, pp. 513–514.
175Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 59.
176For the relevant data and methodology, see chapter 6. As a robustness check, my estimate of
TFP growth rate in whole industry during 1948–200, 3.67%, comes rather close to what Jalava et
al. report for manufacturing during the respective period (3.80%).
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compared to the annual average of 2.2% during 1900–2015. Furthermore, Jalava
estimates, that approximately 33% of TFP growth in 1920–1938 can be attributed
to eletrification.177 In many occasions, eletricity provided for the first time ever a
possibility to replace routine tasks carried out by brute muscle by simple machinery.
It also sped up the introduction of the newest technology.178
After WWII eletrification had reached its peak, but industry kept growing rapidly.
During the Golden years of 1947–1973, real GVA grew 7.1% per annum in an aver-
age branch, compared to staggering 10.8% in 1920–1938. TFP growth also slightly
moderated, standing at 3.8%. A key factor behind the impressive growth perfor-
mance was a shift from small-scale establishments to methods of mass production,
an ongoing process in other European countries, as well.179 Due to a sizeable gap to
the technological frontier and the need for reconstruction, Finland was able to bor-
row technology and reorganize the means of production fast. Every fixed investment
included years’ amount of cumulated human investment, which saturated to growth
rates.180 The growing scale of production could be chased down to industrial hand-
icraft’s proportion of total industrial plants, which declined from circa 75% to just
40% during 1950–1972.181 An additional incentive for introducing mass production
was the progress of European integration, which opened up markets for a growing
supply.182
In the next two decades the growth rate in industry toned down, with respect to both
volume and TFP. From 1973 to 1990, real GVA grew 3.2% per year and TFP 2.0%
per year. The changing trend followed the pattern of other European economies,
and was probably because the gains of catch-up were wearing thin. Technology
could no longer be copied, it had to be invented.183 In consequence, factories sought
efficiency improvements by downsizings and mergers, which increased markedly in
177Jalava 2007, p. 116.
178Riitta Hjerppe and Jalava 2006, p. 53.
179Eichengreen 2007.
180Jalava and Hjerppe note, that technological progress in Finland has relied typically on bor-
rowing of technology. Riitta Hjerppe and Jalava 2006, p. 55. See also Myllyntaus 1992, p. 638.
181The shift to factories was particularly evident in metal, mining and food, beverage and tobacco
industries. Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, pp. 410–430.
182Eichengreen 2007, p. 38.
183Ibid., pp. 252–256.
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Figure 4: TFP, cumulative sum of yearly change in percentage points 1900–2015,
by branch
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Finnish industry as of the late 1980s.184 The reshuffling of production further inten-
sified in the early 1990s, as Finland was hit by the worst recession of her economic
history. On the upside, efficiency appeared to materialize in the years to follow, as
TFP growth rate jumped to 3.3% in 1991–2007. It remains unclear, however, to
what extent the increase can be attributed to business restructuring, since efficiency
was simultaneously improved by the ICT boom. According to Pohjola, ICT’s con-
tribution to TFP growth rate from 1996 to 2005 was nearly 40% within the whole
economy, while Jalava evaluates a contribution as high as 90% over the 1990s.185
The flagship of ICT industry was the telecommunications company Nokia, which
184Ojala and Karonen 2006, p. 110.
185Pohjola 2017, pp. 468–469; Jalava 2007, p. 116.
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Figure 5: Capital-labour ratios 1900–2015, by branch
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according to Asplund and Maliranta corresponded for over a quarter of the GDP
growth rate at its peak in year 2000.186
With respect to bargaining power, both employees and employers saw it wise to
organize their operation in the 1880s, as the first workers’ associations and trade
unions were established.187 The founding of central organisations, SAK and STK,
took place in 1907.188 Despite the emergence of necessary organs, only a minority of
wage earners negotiated their wages in local collective agreements or via collective
186Asplund and Maliranta 2007, p. 313.
187Hannikainen and Heikkinen 2006, p. 171.
188SAK was an employee organisation, known by the time as SAJ, while STK was an employer
body.
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Figure 6: Union density and strike days per one thousand employees in whole
industry
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bargaining in the early 20th century.189 During the interwar years employers main-
tained an upper hand in the labour market. Class skirmish of the 1920s, partly a
legacy of the bitter Civil War in 1918, culminated over the Great Depression as right-
wing extremists pressured the parliament to close down ”communist” organisations,
including the Central Organisation of Trade Unions, SAK.190
A few months after the closure, SAK was re-established, and during the 1930s also
189Hannikainen and Heikkinen 2006, p. 172.
190Regarding the labour market relations, see ibid. and Ojala and Karonen 2006. With respect
to political turbulence, see Jussila, Hentila¨, and Nevakivi 2009, pp. 152–154.
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the political landscape stabilized.191 The necessity of co-operation during WWII
wiped the slate clean considering labour market relations. In 1940, STK and SAK
recognized each other as equal bargaining partners for the first time, in an event
known as tammikuun kihlaus. Subsequently, union membership virtually exploded
increasing union density threefold in 1943–1945, which shows vividly in Figure 6.192
After the war, Finland gradually began to practice a labour market policy which
was grounded on collective wage agreements and occasional devaluations, together
upholding cost competitiveness.193
In 1968, the first national income policy agreement reinforced the status of corpo-
ratism in Finnish economic policy.194 The 1968 agreement materialized simultae-
nously with another upsurge in union density at the turn of the 1970s, when SAK
was unified after disputes of the preceding decade.195 The latest disruption regard-
ing labour market relations was the economic crisis of the 1990s, which convinced
many that corporatism was an outdated system in a globalized world economy.
Soaring unemployment and national debt made trade unions fall from favour with
the general public, leading to a series of exceptionally moderate wage agreements,
and stagnation of union density.196 A concrete example of weakening unions was
the prime minister Esko Aho’s unforeseen attempt to reduce nominal wages in a
so called ’new social contract’, an epochal proposal despite it was not eventually
implemented.197
Finally, let us consider what is to be explained, referring to the development of
the dependent variable in time. In Figure 7, we can see that industry as a whole
experienced a sharp downward turn in labour share after the Civil War in 1918,
during the Great Recession of the 1930s, and in the economic crisis of the 1990s.198
191Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 184.
192Ibid., pp. 358–361.
193Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 1993.
194Ibid., p. 285.
195Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, pp. 362–369.
196Sauramo 2016. Notice, that the peak in union density during 1990–1993 in Figure 6 is merely
a cyclical phenomenon, resulting from a sharp drop in employment. From 1990 to 1993, the number
of employees contracted by over a hundred thousand, while the number of union members remained
virtually constant.
197Kiander and Vartia 1998, pp. 289–290; Kiander, Pekka Sauramo, and Tanninen 2011, p. 14.
198This observations was first made in Hannikainen and Heikkinen 2006, p. 173.
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Remarkable upward hikes took place right after the WWII and, in somewhat lesser
extent, during the latest economic crisis around 2010. Considering the overall trend,
Kaldor’s hypothesis of stable shares can be outrightly rejected. In addition, Kuznets
curve cannot give a satisfactory explanation to the observed pattern. It could be
described as roughly accurate until the early 1990s, as labour share first has a
tendency to fall in 1860–1943 and an aptness to grow in 1944–1991. The subsequent
decline, however, breaks the curve’s explanatory power. Piketty’s emphasis on the
turbulent decades in 1914–1945 earns the strongest visual support, yet it concerns
exclusively WWII.
Descriptive statistics of all relevant variables in my aggregate level data are presented
in Table 1, while the ones for panel data are reported in Table 2. Note, that I have
trade data only for total of 8 branches. Union density is available altogether for 10
branches. Import and export exposure by branch as well as union density by branch
are visualized in Figure B1 and Figure B2. Averages by branch can be found in
Table B3.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of aggregate data
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
WS 156 48.2 5.3
LS 156 52.1 5.9
ALS 156 53.1 6.4
NALS 102 65.2 10.2
∆TFP 115 2.2 8.1
K
L
116 81.7 66.1
density 108 42.8 28.1
trade
GV A
156 200.2 84.3
M
GV A
156 106.7 62.0
X
GV A
156 93.6 29.5
strikes 107 740.0 2085.9
A&D
GDP
123 122.7 197.5
exp
GDP
156 14.8 8.0
K
Y
116 4.1 0.8
r 116 11.6 2.6
Note: WS is wage share, LS is labour share, ALS is adjusted labour share, NALS is net ad-
justed labour share, TFP is the growth rate of total factor productivity, KL is real net capital
stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed in millions of euros, union density is
union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA , where the former is the value of imports as a
share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports as a share of GVA, strikes is working days
lost due strikes per one thousand employees, A&DGDP is to foreign assets and debts as a share
of GDP, expGDP is public consumption as a share of GDP,
K
Y is capital-output ratio at market
value, and r refers to rate of return on capital.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of panel data
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
WS 1715 50.3 15.7
LS 1715 54.3 16.2
ALS 1715 56.0 17.6
NALS 1122 66.9 20.3
∆TFP 1261 2.2 15.1
K
L
1276 115.1 217.5
density 773 41.8 34.4
trade
GV A
1227 231.4 250.4
M
GV A
837 182.3 220.0
X
GV A
1167 112.6 136.4
strikes 1177 610.7 3019.2
K
Y
1276 5.0 4.2
r 1272 12.1 7.6
Note: WS is wage share, LS is labour share, ALS is adjusted labour share, NALS is net ad-
justed labour share, ∆TFP is the growth rate of total factor productivity, KL is real net capital
stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed in millions of euros, density is union den-
sity, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA , where the former is the value of imports as a share of
GVA and the latter is the value of exports as a share of GVA, strikes is working days lost due
strikes per one thousand employees, KY is capital-output ratio at market value, and r refers to
rate of return on capital.
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Figure 7: Adjusted labour share 1860–2015, whole industry
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Sources: Aggregated from branch-level data. For sources, see chapter 6.
57
7.2 Regression analysis
This section presents and discusses the results of my regression analysis. I begin the
examination from the aggregate level, which equals time series analysis. Second,
I analyse the branch-level data with panel regressions, including rich sensitivity
analysis and disaggregation of the dependent variable. Third, I conclude the analysis
section with additional robustness checks, which ensure that the main results are
not biased by serial correlation.
Table 3 summarizes my time series analysis. It provides a first, yet crude glance to
the determinants of labour share. The most explicit observation from Table 3 is,
that the technology variables matter. Both TFP and capital-labour ratio come out
with statistically significant and negative coefficients in numerous specifications at
least at the 5% level: the former in all four, and the latter in all except one. Taking
note of the other independent variables, one common feature is that they are all
statistically insignificant, and not too different from zero. Trade share has a modest
negative relation with labour share, which seems to be driven by export exposure.
Nominal exchange rate has also the expected negative connection, which triples once
I use a lagged regressor, but remains negligible even so. Curiously, foreign assets
and debts and public expenditure are estimated to have adverse impact on labour
share with respect to theory. Ultimately, union density’s influence on labour share
could be judged as non-existent.
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Table 3: Results of time series analysis
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.41***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
K/L -0.35** -0.35** -0.23 -0.37**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.16)
Union density -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
trade
GV A
-0.05
(0.05)
M
GV A
0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
X
GV A
-0.05 -0.05 -0.04
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
A&D
GDP
0.04
(0.04)
exp
GDP
-0.08
(0.08)
NX -0.01
(0.07)
L1. NX -0.03
(0.05)
Constant 0.02** 0.02** 0.02 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 105 105 105 105
Note: Dependent variable is the adjusted labour share. TFP is the growth rate of total factor
productivity, K/L is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed
at thousands of euros, union density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA ,
where the former is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports
as a share of GVA, and strikes refers to the working days lost due to strikes per one thousand
employees. All variables are expressed as log first differences, except for TFP, which is ex-
pressed as the annual growth rate in decimal form. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Next, I extend my analysis to cross-sectional dimension. In the baseline models,
I examine the determinants of labour share using panel data of eleven industrial
branches. For starters, I have pictured the correlations between labour share and
the main independent variables with scatter plots in Figure 8. Each scatter plot
corresponds to a bivariate regression, where labour share works as a right-hand side
and one of K
L
ratio, TFP, union density or trade share as the left-hand side variable.
The scatter plots provide an explicit prediction for three variables, excluding TFP: K
L
ratio and trade share appear to be in negative relation with labour share, while union
density’s correlation appears to be positive. Of course, these are na¨ıve comparisons,
since the regressions include no controls. However, based on the smooth behaviour
of the bivariate scatter plots the log-log functional form appears to be justifiable.199
Table 4 reports the first set of panel regressions, including the baseline specifications.
According to the preferred FE-models, the determinants of labour share get a bit
more multifaceted compared to the time series analysis. First, TFP shows a robust
negative correlation with labour share in different specifications. Similar to the time
series analysis, the negative effect of K
L
ratio is established here, as well. However,
it seems to be particularly sensitive to whether or not import rate is included to the
regression. At the branch-level, union density appears to have a notable and robust,
positive effect on labour share. Contradicting the visual suggestions in Figure 8,
once conditioned on covariates, trade share’s negative correlation with labour share
turns positive, yet statistically insignificant. Intriguingly, once we separate trade
into imports and exports they both show positive correlation with labour share,
import share’s impact being both sizable and robust.
Table 5 represents the baseline regressions using weighted least squares and five-year
log differences. Comfortably, the results remain by and large the same as in Table 4.
The magnitude of all coefficients except the one on import exposure appears to grow
slightly when applying WLS. Intuitively, the WLS-estimators are more informative
about the relative importance of each independent variable from the viewpoint of a
single employee, since the regressions are weighted by the number of employees, while
OLS-estimators tell the impact of each factor on a figurative average branch.200 The
199A similar argument is made in Graetz and Michaels 2018, pp. 19–20.
200Angrist and Pischke 2009, pp. 40–41, 92.
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Figure 8: Bivariate regressions between adjusted labour share and the main inde-
pendent variables
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Notes: Each dot corresponds to one of the eleven branches in a bivariate regression of the form
lnALSit = β0+β1Xit+it, where X is one of the four explanatory variables. The sample period for
the technology variables is 1900–2015, for union density 1907–2015, and for trade share 1860–2015.
The red lines represent the respective regression lines.
five-year FD-estimates are also in line with the baseline results, albeit they predict
a larger effect from TFP, while the coefficient on import exposure turns imprecise.
A second round of sensitivity analysis is offered in Table 6. In the first two regres-
sions, the five-year log difference specifications have been rerun using WLS. The
latter two exert also long differences and include branch-specific trends. The main
take-away from Table 6 is that the relations found in baseline regressions maintain
robust, with one exception: import exposure’s estimate is again imprecise. It seems
that when examining long differences, the broadly defined trade exposure captures
the positive impact from imports. Meanwhile, note that union density comes out
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Table 4: Baseline regressions
FE, OLS
(1) (2) (3)
TFP -0.24* -0.19*** -0.26***
(0.13) (0.05) (0.04)
K/L -0.13 -0.44*** -0.40***
(0.13) (0.08) (0.10)
Union density 0.20*** 0.14***
(0.06) (0.04)
trade
GV A
0.07
(0.05)
M
GV A
0.12*** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.05)
X
GV A
0.08*** 0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
Strikes 0.00
(0.00)
Constant 3.45*** 4.30*** 3.95***
(0.45) (0.20) (0.23)
Branch fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.54 0.62 0.72
N 588 374 388
Note: Dependent variable is the adjusted labour share. TFP is the growth rate of total factor
productivity, K/L is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed
at thousands of euros, union density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA ,
where the former is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports
as a share of GVA, and strikes refers to the working days lost due to strikes per one thousand
employees. All variables are expressed as log levels, except for TFP, which is expressed as the
annual growth rate in decimal form. Block bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
statistically insignificant and the technology variables only marginally significant in
specification (2). That said, the point estimates on all variables are comparable to
earlier results, and the lack of preciseness is probably due to small sample size. In
62
Table 5: Baseline regressions, alternative specifications
FE, WLS 5-year FD, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP -0.31** -0.32*** -0.50*** -0.43**
(0.13) (0.04) (0.10) (0.15)
K/L -0.16 -0.43*** -0.24* -0.43**
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18)
Union density 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
trade
GV A
0.03 0.09**
(0.05) (0.03)
M
GV A
0.13** 0.15
(0.05) (0.08)
X
GV A
0.01 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Constant 3.77*** 4.21*** -0.02 0.02
(0.48) (0.21) (0.10) (0.18)
Branch fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.58 0.76 0.44 0.47
N 588 388 102 63
Note: Dependent variable is the adjusted labour share. TFP is the growth rate of total factor
productivity, K/L is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed
at thousands of euros, density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA , where
the former is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports as a
share of GVA, and strikes refers to the working days lost due to strikes per one thousand em-
ployees. All variables in specifications (1) and (2) are expressed as log levels, except for TFP,
which is expressed as the annual growth rate in decimal form. Specifications (1) and (2) have
been weighted using each branch’s average employment in 1907–2015. In specifications (3) and
(4), all variables are expressed as log first differences over five years, except for TFP, which is
expressed as the cumulative growth over five years in decimal form. Standard errors, which are
block bootstrap in specifications (1) and (2) and clustered in models (3) and (4), in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
specifications (3) and (4), regarding the inclusion of branch-specific trends, which
is a strong control against time-varying omitted variables, the consistency of coeffi-
cients is quite reassuring. Overall, the impact of TFP is yet again estimated to be
notably larger than in the baseline scenario.
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Table 6: Baseline regressions, more alternative specifications
5-year FD, WLS 5-year FD, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP -0.47** -0.44* -0.55*** -0.50**
(0.13) (0.21) (0.12) (0.19)
K/L -0.26** -0.47** -0.26* -0.47*
(0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.20)
Union density 0.12*** 0.12 0.13*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
trade
GV A
0.10** 0.09**
(0.03) (0.03)
M
GV A
0.16 0.16
(0.09) (0.09)
X
GV A
-0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.08 0.15 -0.01 -0.01
(0.13) (0.26) (0.10) (0.19)
Branch fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch-specific trends No No Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.42 0.48 0.42 0.44
N 102 63 102 63
Note: Dependent variable is the adjusted labour share. TFP is the growth rate of total factor
productivity, K/L is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed
at thousands of euros, density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA , where
the former is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports as
a share of GVA. All variables are expressed as log first differences over five years, except for
TFP, which is expressed as the cumulative growth over five years in decimal form. Specifica-
tions (1) and (2) have been weighted using each branch’s average employment in 1907–2015.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
To ensure that the found correlations are not sensible to the computation method of
labour income share, I have rerun the baseline models from Table 4 using wage share
and net adjusted labour share as an independent variable. In both cases, the results
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change only trivially. To address the concern of instant simultaneity, I re-estimated
the same models once more, using 3 and 5 year lags of union density and capital
intensity. Again, the coefficients are comparable to the ones figured in Table 4. The
robustness checks described here are gathered in Table B1.
As a reality check on my estimates I compare them to previous research. Consid-
ering the technology variables, the preferred baseline point estimates in Table 4 are
below the ones presented in Hutchinson & Persyn: they estimate elasticities of –0.62
and –0.55 for TFP and K
L
ratio, while the respective numbers here are –0.26 and
–0.40.201 Note, however, that Hutchinson and Persyn define capital-labour ratio as
capital stock per labour input of low- and medium-skilled labour. In a more recent
study, Autor and Salomons find a TFP elasticity closer to mine (–0.37) in a sam-
ple constrained to manufacturing.202 The relationship between union density and
labour share has often found to be statistically insignificant in empirical examina-
tions, so the connection in this thesis is a deviation to the tradition.203 The only
other statistically significant estimate is found in Stockhammer, which is, however,
very similar in magnitude: Stockhammer calculates that a one percentage point
increase in union density increases the labour share from 0.18 to 0.20 percentage
points.204 Transformed into comparable units, my estimate predicts a 0.18 p.p. in-
crease.205 The impact of trade on labour share is often proxied with plain trade
share, which has yielded negative coefficients, in contrast to the analysis above.206
In a prominent study, Elsby et al. also find import exposure to have negative effect
on labour share.207 In light of this evidence, my estimate is again a minor surprise.
Yet when Autor et al. try to replicate Elsby et al.’s result, they find that at least
Chinese imports have indeed a positive impact on labour share, which is established
also in an IV-analysis, suggesting a causal relation.208
201See Hutchinson and Persyn 2012, p. 32, and the preferred specification (4).
202D. Autor and Salomons 2018, pp. 28, 57.
203Bengtsson emphasizes the role of union power as a labour share determinant in Sweden, where
the employer-employee relations have developed comparably to Finland. However, he is unable to
establish the connection in an econometric analysis (Bengtsson 2014, p. 299)
204Stockhammer 2009, pp. 45–50, the preferred specifications (Table 9).
205 βdensityALS1900−2015
density1900−2015
= 0.142×54.2742.78 ≈ 0.18
206Section 3.2.
207Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin 2013, p. 42.
208D. Autor, Dorn, F. Katz, et al. 2017, pp. 24–25, 73.
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Recall, that only the technology variables achieved statistical significance in the
time series analysis, while union density and import exposure yielded coefficients of
practically zero. The difference between time series and FE-estimates is curious, but
not overly surprising. It could demonstrate a scenario, where density and imports
inflict negative spill-over effects on other branches, which neutralize their positive
within-branch impact. Another potential explanation for the discrepancy is, that
the aggregate time series are just too crude to distinguish the comparatively smaller
effects of union density and import exposure. Expressing the variables in log levels,
instead of log differences, could also prove crucial. In Table B2, I have re-estimated
the two baseline FE-specifications using 1-year log first differences, and at least
with regards to union density, the coefficients are remarkably smaller. I prefer the
baseline FE-estimates, since inference using a panel is arguably more efficient, and
yearly differences are potentially insufficient to identify the true effect.
7.2.1 Interpretation and robustness
Union density’s robust, positive impact on labour share could signify the fact that in
Finland the density has been exceptionally high in international comparison, which
has caused a pivotal difference considering bargaining power. In other words, the
Finnish unions have been powerful enough to make their demands heard.209 Another
possible interpretation is that in majority of previous studies the sample period has
been too short to successfully account for the effect of unions on labour share.210
Thus, there has not been enough variance in union density to pin down the actual
effect: at least in Finland, the biggest change in density happens just after WWII.
In samples which begin from the 1970s, or even the 1990s, there may not be enough
information of the relation between density and the labour share, which increases
the variance of OLS estimates and yields insignificant results. Finally, Finland’s
high coverage rate could turn out crucial: because of the long-lived centralized wage
209Union density’s importance as a labour share determinant in Finnish environment matches
the perception of Hannikainen and Heikkinen 2006.
210Farber et al. point out, that union density’s effect on inequality was at its largest during 1940–
1970 in the U.S., since the composition of union members was uncommonly negatively selected at
the time. Because unions successfully attracted relatively large amount of less educated employees
and minorities, their impact on income distribution was consequently enhanced. Farber et al. 2018,
pp. 4, 16–17
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agreement system, unions can affect the wages of non-union-members, as well.211
Consequently, their impact on wages increases.
Reflecting the excess profit hypothesis, the positive impact of import exposure on
labour share might be due to its negative impact on profits. The idea is the following:
growing number of imports could enhance competitive pressure in a given branch
and by cutting profits increase the share of labour. The positive coefficient on import
share may, however, suffer from upward bias, as well. In one scenario, the growing
volume of imports encourages businesses to outsource labour-intensive operations
into cheaper environments abroad. While effectively handling the negative pressure
on labour share with outsourcing, the kind of reorganisation described creates an
artificial upward push on labour share.212
Considering the other two variables, the interpretation of their coefficients demands
more scrutiny. The complications arise from the fact that the effect of TFP and
K
L
ratio depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. This
interrelation was elaborated in chapter 4. Recall, that according to the theory model,
TFP would have a negative impact on labour share in case the elasticity was below
one. Moreover, if the elasticity was below unity, the model predicts a positive impact
from K
L
ratio. The regressions, on the other hand, show a negative connection for
both. To shed light on the inconsistency, I turn to estimate the elasticity.
For starters, I have estimated the elasticity of substitution in 1900–2015 using spec-
ification (19), reproduced here:
ln rit = β0 + γi + λt + β1 ln
(
K
Y
)
it
+ it
Omitting branch- and time fixed effects, the resulting equation is:
ln rit = 3.614(0.267)−
0.897
(0.128) ln
(
K
Y
)
it
n = 1262 Adj.R2 = 0.60
211Since the late 1990s, the coverage rate has varied between 90% to 98% Pekka Sauramo 2012,
p. 20.
212Labour Losing to Capital: What Explains the Declining Labour Share? 2012, p. 131.
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Consequently, the long-term elasticity of interest is σ =
∣∣∣ 1
β1
∣∣∣ = 10.897 = 1.11.213 The
first thing to notice is, considering a standard error of 0.13, the elasticity does not
differ significantly from one, which is the Cobb-Douglas case. However, since the
point estimate is above one, a negative coefficient on K
L
ratio is indeed what one
should expect, based on equation (11). So, a simple conclusion can be drawn: in the
long-term, the interrelation between capital-labour ratio and labour share appears
to fit the neoclassical model. Equivalently, the long-term determinant defining the
interrelation is technology, instead of market power.
In light of the estimated long-term elasticity, TFP’s negative coefficient remains an
anomaly. Figure 9 pursues to disentangle it by graphing the parameters of interest
over time. In Figure 9, the elasticity of substitution and coefficient on K
L
ratio
from specifications (19) and (18) are estimated in a moving 40-year interval by
applying the rolling regression. In rolling regression the above-said equations are
solved repeatedly in an interval that shifts one year forward before each estimation.
Thus, the sample period in the first regression is 1900–1939, in the second it is 1901–
1940, and so on. TFP’s coefficient in the bottom panel was estimated simultaneously
with the one on K
L
ratio.
213This is in line with Jalava et al., who report that a long run elasticity of one cannot be rejected
in Finnish context. Jalava, Pohjola, et al. 2005, pp. 8–9.
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Figure 9: Coefficient on capital-labour ratio and elasticity of substitution over time
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Notes: Each line represents regression coefficients from rolling regressions with a regression win-
dow of 40 years. The elasticity of substitution is computed as
∣∣∣ 1β1 ∣∣∣ from specification (19). The
coefficients on KL and TFP come from specification (18). Values of zero for coefficients and one for
the elasticity are denoted with red reference lines.
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According to the predictions set out by the neoclassical model, elasticity of substi-
tution and the coefficient on capital-labour ratio should follow an inverse relation.
Specifically, if the elasticity is greater (smaller) than one, the coefficient should be
negative (positive). Moreover, the elasticity and the coefficient on TFP ought to
show a positive correlation: when the former is above (below) one, the latter ought
to be positive (negative). These dependencies are based on equations (11) and (12),
respectively. Figure 9 brings an empirical verification, for the most part, for both
claims. In the upper panel, the sign on capital-labour tends to switch when the
elasticity crosses the cut-off point of one. In addition, when mirrored against the
bottom panel, the elasticity seems to correlate rather clearly with TFP’s coeffi-
cient. However, two oddities stand out. First, the coefficient on TFP appears to
be negative, despite the elasticity of substitution is above one in the earlier sample
intervals. This could be due to either an upward bias in the elasticity or a downward
bias in TFP’s coefficient and does not necessarily invalidate the theory. Second, the
elasticity and K
L
ratio’s coefficient experience a meaningful discrepancy during the
later sample intervals, that is, the inverse relation breaks. The discrepancy is most
explicit around 1966–2005.
Based on the above observations, I derive another two conclusions: for one, tech-
nological change in Finnish industry could be described as labour-saving, rather
than capital-saving.214 For two, the negative coefficient on K
L
ratio is somewhat
downward biased, and the bias is especially pervasive from 1966 to 2005. The first
conclusion emerges from the good predictive power of the theory model, equation
(12) in particular, presented in chapter 4. The second conclusion is based on the
discrepancy, which signifies that the perfect markets assumption fails during the
four decades preceding the Great Recession.
The sudden downward bias in capital-labour ratio’s coefficient implies that the
capital-owners possessed substantial market power at some point in 1966–2005. The
attribute ‘substantial’ is based on the size of the discrepancy: against the estimated
elasticity of hardly 0.7, the coefficient ought to be highly positive. In order to test
this theoretical argument, I have pictured the development of two market power
214The same conclusion was by Hjerppe and Jalava 2007. See Riitta Hjerppe and Jalava 2006,
p. 56.
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indicators from 1890 to 2012 in Figure 10. On the grounds of changes in market
and employment shares of three largest businesses by industry, the employers have
become remarkably more concentrated since the late 1980s.215 To put the volumes
in perspective, I compare them to analogous indicators in Autor et al. While in
the U.S. the market share of four largest manufacturing companies hovered just
below 44% in 2012, in Finland the arithmetic average of the largest three stood at
52%. In terms of employment, the analogous concentration ratios were more sen-
sible, yielding circa 34% for the U.S. and 32% for Finland, but again, the setting
is three against four.216 In contrast, in EU the market share of four largest firms
appears to have fallen after the break of millennia, standing approximately at 30%
in 2012. This statistic, however, includes all industries.217 Nevertheless, the two
indicators provide rather strong reassurance to my interpretation, that the capital-
owners enjoyed significant market power at some point from 1966 to 2005. To be
more precise, the increase in market power appears to have realized from the late
1980s to mid-2000s.
215The concentration resulted from an unforeseen wave of corporate acquisitions and mergers.
See Ojala and Karonen 2006, p. 110 and Riitta Hjerppe 1988b, p. 74.
216For the concentration ratios in the U.S., see D. Autor, Dorn, F. Katz, et al. 2017, p. 34.
217The share is computed as a weighted average of 4-firm concentration ratios across industries,
treating each country as a separate market. Therefore, it is roughly comparable to the numbers in
Figure 10. See Gutie´rrez 2017, p. 19.
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Figure 10: Market and employment shares of three largest companies 1890–2012,
by industry
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Notes: The concentration ratio for markets is the sum of sales in the three largest companies
as a share of gross value of production in a given industry. For employment, it is the sum of
employment in the three largest companies as a share of total employment in a given industry.
From 1988 onwards, branch-level data has been aggregated to the selected four industries as a
weighted average by gross value of production or employment across branches.a
Sources: Sales in largest companies: Hjerppe 1979; Year-book of business in Finland 1972, 1979.
Market concentration ratio: Enterprises 1988–2012. Gross value of production: Heikkinen &
Hjerppe 1986; Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1929, 1951, 1973; Industrial statistics 1938; NA
1975–2015. Employment in largest companies: Hjerppe 1979. Total employment: Heikkinen &
Hjerppe 1986; Hjerppe et al. 1976; NA 1975–2015. Employment concentration ratio: Enterprises
1988–2012.
aA method also followed by Gutierrez (2017): see Gutie´rrez 2017, pp. 25–26.
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The nature of each independent variable’s relation with labour share is so far only
speculative. Disaggregation of the dependent variable should bring some more light
on the issue. Table 7 suggests that the technology variables’ diminishing effect on
labour share is due to mainly their push for economic growth. Another, equally
truthful interpretation is that while technology boosts growth, the labour costs do
not follow suit, which is demonstrated in specifications (3) and (4).218 In fact,
capital accumulation’s relation with the real compensation of labour appears to be
almost non-existent, conditional on covariates, based on specification (4). This gives
additional weight to the suspicion that K
L
ratio’s coefficient is downward biased due
to market imperfections. Because of unknown rigidities, possibly economic rents,
technological advancement does not saturate directly on wages. Union density has,
as suspected, a positive pull on wages, but also a disturbing negative relation with
the gross value added. The latter could reflect a scenario where unions manage to
squeeze employers’ profits over the wage bargaining process.219 Imports’ negative
impact on output is in line with the scenario where imports boost labour share by
reaping excess profits.
As discussed in section 5.2, as a last trial to the robustness of my results, I follow
Cameron et al.’s recommendation and replicate the core of my analysis while apply-
ing Wild cluster bootstrap standard errors. The check is done to make sure that
serial correlation has not biased the standard errors toward zero, leading to false
rejections of the null. Turns out that the pass is close to perfect. In Table 8, all the
robust correlations found in the baseline models remain statistically significant at
least at the 5% level, except for TFP in specification (1), which is significant at the
12% level. This in mind, I account the results overall fairly solid.
218Autor and Salomons report a similar result. They estimate a nominal-wage-TFP elasticity of
0.14 and a real-value-added-TFP elasticity of 0.92 in manufacturing. The analogous numbers here
are 0.19–0.26 and 0.58–0.62, albeit the first elasticity is actually a real-wage-TFP elasticity. See
D. Autor and Salomons 2018, p. 57.
219In terms of the model in chapter 4, I propose that KL is positively correlated with the mark-up
pi, while union density is positively correlated with ”union power” γ.
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Table 7: Disaggregating the dependent variable: GVA and wages
FE, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GVA GVA LC LC
TFP 0.61** 0.56** 0.19* 0.26**
(0.22) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09)
K/L 0.81*** 1.11** 0.21* 0.01
(0.19) (0.36) (0.10) (0.10)
Union density -0.40* -0.52*** 0.12* 0.11***
(0.20) (0.11) (0.05) (0.01)
trade
GV A
-0.29 -0.05
(0.23) (0.06)
M
GV A
-0.58** -0.09**
(0.22) (0.03)
X
GV A
0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Constant 10.91*** 11.31*** 0.24 1.27**
(1.29) (1.53) (0.66) (0.46)
Branch fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.99
N 588 388 588 388
Note: Dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is the real GVA, while in specifications
(3) and (4) it is the real labour cost. TFP is the growth rate of total factor productivity, K/L
is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed at thousands of
euros, union density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA , where the for-
mer is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports as a share
of GVA. All variables are expressed as log levels, except for TFP, which is expressed as the
annual growth rate in decimal form. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 8: Addressing serial correlation
FE, OLS
(1) (2)
TFP -0.24 -0.26***
[0.11] [0.00]
K/L -0.13 -0.40***
[0.48] [0.00]
Union density 0.20* 0.14**
[0.05] [0.04]
trade
GV A
0.07
[0.32]
M
GV A
0.14***
[0.00]
X
GV A
0.03
[0.56]
Constant 3.41** 4.42***
[0.03] [0.00]
Branch fixed effects Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.72 0.81
N 588 388
Note: Dependent variable is the adjusted labour share. TFP is the growth rate of total factor
productivity, K/L is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed
at thousands of euros, density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA , where
the former is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports as a
share of GVA. All variables are expressed as log levels, except for TFP, which is expressed as
the annual growth rate in decimal form. P-values based on Wild cluster bootstrap standard
errors in square brackets.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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8 Reflection
Considering the discovered marginal effects and the evolution of the elasticity of
substitution between labour and capital, the overall evidence suggests that the big
picture of Finnish factor shares is mainly a story of technological automation and
shifts in the distribution of rents. In this section I will provide some additional
weight to this scenario. I start by reflecting the results against the theory set out
in chapter 4. Next, I compute some economic magnitudes. Finally, I pursue to
periodize the development of labour share, discussing how the results compare to
history.
Altogether, my interpretation of the empirical results is consistent with the theory
model represented in chapter 4. At first glance, the technology variables’ coefficients
and the estimated elasticity of substitution appeared to contradict. However, in
section 7.2 I demonstrated, that the contradiction was just a matter of timing: the
negative coefficient on TFP was driven by post-WWII and the one on capital-labour
ratio by pre-WWII period. Taking this into account, the estimated relationships
were as expected based on equations (11) and (12). TFP’s marginal effect was
positively correlated and capital-labour ratio’s marginal effect negatively correlated
with the elasticity of substitution. There were anomalies, however: during the first
half of the 20th century, increase in either TFP or K
L
ratio predicted a decline in
labour share. I argue that the anomaly is modest and does not invalidate the model’s
overall good fit.
The discrepancy between K
L
ratio’s coefficient and the elasticity from 1966 to 2005
was taken as a signal of increased monopoly rents. This conclusion was backed
by a distinct increase in the market power of businesses, demonstrated in Figure
10. Theoretically, monopoly rents mark an increase in pi, whereas equation (14)
shows, that an increase in pi predicts a decrease in labour share. Growth in union
density would translate to an increase in γ, which implies an upward push for labour
share, evident in equation (15). Considering import exposure, the observed positive
correlation can be rationalized with imports’ downward pressure on both power
parameters pi and γ, working through increasing competitiveness. In this case, the
squeezing effect on monopoly power pi seems to be dominating.
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Considering the magnitudes of my estimates I offer a few practical examples. They
focus on trajectories of the aggregate labour share apparent in Figure 7, trying to
shed light on the most explicit trends, which I have nailed down to three: pre-WWII,
post-WWII to the 1990s crisis, and post-1990s crisis. In Figure 11, I represent each
variable’s cumulative contribution on labour share during the respective period,
taking the point estimates in my baseline specification at face value.220
220For variables in logs, the cumulative contribution comes from Yt1 − Yt0 = Yt0 Yt1−Yt0Yt0 =
Yt0 [
(
Xt1
Xt0
)βX − 1], where the last term is solved from lnYt1 = β lnXt1 by first substracting lagged
equivalent from both sides, and then manipulating:
lnYt1 − lnYt0 = β(lnXt1 − lnXt0)⇒ ln
(
Yt1
Yt0
)
= ln
(
Xt1
Yt0
)β
⇒ Yt1
Yt0
=
(
Xt1
Xt0
)β
⇒ Yt1 − Yt0
Yt0
=
(
Xt1
Xt0
)β
− 1.
For TFP, the cumulative contribution is Yt0 [exp(βX∆X)− 1], which is similarly solved from
lnYt1 − lnYt0 = β(Xt1 −Xt0)⇒ ln
(
Yt1
Yt0
)
= β∆X
⇒ Yt1
Yt0
= exp(β∆X)⇒ Yt1 − Yt0
Yt0
= exp(β∆X)− 1.
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Figure 11: Contributions of explanatory variables on labour share
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Notes: Each bar represents the cumulative contribution of a variable in question to labour share
under the respective period. For variables in logs, i.e. KL , union density and import exposure, the
cumulative contribution is computed as Yt0 [
(
Xt1
Xt0
)βX − 1], where βX is the regression coefficient
on variable X and Yt0 is the adjusted labour share at the start of the respective period. For TFP,
the cumulative contribution is Yt0 [exp(βX∆X)− 1]. The coefficients come from specification (18),
which is the baseline model. The cumulative change of each variable is calculated based on the
aggregate series.
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Before WWII labour share was overall at low levels compared to the mean of the
century. It experienced distinct drops over WWI and after the Great Depression, of
which the latter proved to be a prolonged state. The total decline from 1907 to 1943
equalled 6.1 percentage points. According to the cumulative contributions, essential
reasons for the decline were increasing capital intensity and decreasing import expo-
sure. However, the two variables alone markedly overstate the contraction, leaving
a positive aggregate factor, captured by time fixed effects, unidentified.
Labour share’s low levels in the first half of the 20th century are best explained
with a low level to start with: the constant in my baseline specification predicts an
average labour share of 51.8% in 1907. Staying low, on the other hand, was mainly
due to increasing capital intensity, illustrated by a massive −15.6 p.p. contribution
in Figure 11. At the time, the substitutability between labour and capital was
good: motive power in many occasions was muscle,221 which could be replaced by
simple machinery once finance became available.222223 Another noteworthy factor
was decreasing import exposure, a result of protectionist trade policy. Doubling
of ad valorem tariffs and approving attitude towards cartels224 combined with the
snowball effect of protectionism elsewhere225 squeezed import exposure by almost
70%. Protectionism restricted competition and consequently inflated profits, leading
to a diminishing labour share.
Sudden noise in labour share fell down to acceleration of TFP in around 1920 and
turmoil in labour market relations. The former owed much to the rapid electrification
of production and improvements in factory design.226 The overall contribution of
221This was the case especially in wood industry. See Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982,
pp. 230–241.
222In the 19th century U.S., capital paired with unskilled labour successfully substituted indus-
trial handicraft, as production moved from artisanal shops to factories. Since the great majority
of plants employed less than five employees in Finland as late as 1950 (ibid., p. 411), the shift to
factories was clearly ongoing in 1907–1943. See Lawrence F Katz and Margo 2013, pp. 1–9, and
Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz 1998, pp. 694–698.
223The financial situation improved at least in two aspects from loaners’ perspective in 1900–
1950, as a number of new banks started operating, and inflation kept cutting the real value of
debts. See Riitta Hjerppe, Peltonen, and Pihkala 1984, p. 47.
224Since several factory owners fought as officers for the victorious Whites in the Civil War, their
benefit was of primary interest in the following decade. See Ojala and Karonen 2006, p. 107.
225Eichengreen 1995.
226According to Jalava, electricity’s share of total motive power in manufacturing grew from 7%
to almost 90% in 1900–1939. Jalava estimates, that electrification contributed approximately 33%
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TFP remained modest, however, since the deterioriation of technology due to WWI
and the Civil War in particular took years to recover from. The latter refers to the
aftermath of the Civil War and could be connected to distributional conflict in the
rest of Europe.227 During the 1920s, the unions were in an upswing compared to the
following decade, which shows in the labour share, as well. The Great Depression
provided fuel for right-wing extremism, which at its starkest lead to the temporary
shut down of the employees’ central organisation, SAK.228
During the post-WWII decades until the 1990s crisis, labour share saw a spectacular
increase, from 41.7% in 1943 to record-high 69.9% in 1991. Speaking in changes,
this corresponds a 28.2 percentage point jump. Around a third of the increase is
predicted by union density, while the bulk of it can be attributed to an aggregate
trend.
After WWII, labour share was affected by conflicting pressures. Aggressive capital
fundamentalism, accelerating convergence process and a shift towards mass produc-
tion materialized in a sizable downward pressure from technology variables, K
L
ratio
and TFP.229 However, the cut was more than compensated for by unknown aggre-
gate level factors, captured by time fixed effects. Meanwhile, union density was
growing fast: while circa 15% of industry employees belonged to an union in 1943,
the proportion more than quadrupled by 1991. Majority of the increase took place
in 1943–1945, due to the new political mandate of SAK established over the war,
and again around the early 1970s, when the central organisation was unified after
in-house disagreements of the preceeding decade.230 In consequence, union density
had a non-trivial impact on labour share, corresponding to around 35% of the over-
all increase (10.0/28.2).231 Import exposure’s influence remained modest, because
imports grew sluggishly pre-1990s.
Following the economic crisis of the 1990s, the labour share in Finnish industry
of TFP growth in Finland from 1920 to 1938. Jalava 2007, pp. 116–126.
227Eichengreen 1995, pp. 390–400.
228Jussila, Hentila¨, and Nevakivi 2009, pp. 152–160.
229Kokkinen et al. 2007, pp. 164–168; Ahvenainen, Pihkala, and Rasila 1982, p. 410.
230See section 7.1.
231In an analogous setting, Farber et al. find that an increase in union density can explain around
9% to 17% of the observed decline in Gini coefficient in the U.S. during 1940–1960. See Farber
et al. 2018, p. 52.
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experienced a historically drastic downturn. From top to bottom, the labour share
sunk from record-high 69.9% to 46.2% in 1991–2007. Overall, the drop was 23.7
percentage points. This time around the key component was the rapid growth of
TFP, which predicted approximately 60% of the total decrease (−14.3/−23.7).
Roaming TFP growth rates corresponded to the booming ICT-industry and efficiency-
improving downsizing across industrial branches.232 Especially fast growers in ad-
dition to metal industry, which included ICT, were paper, food etc. and wood
industries, all experiencing a TFP growth rate over 4%. Another reason for the
declining labour share was the steady increase in capital intensity. The contribution
of K
L
ratio was overshadowed by previous periods, since Finnish industry caught up
with the technological frontier over the 1990s, which slowed down the growth rate
of capital stock remarkably. Even so, note that capital intensity’s contribution was
downward biased due to growing monopoly rents. Import exposure experienced a
considerable increase, matching with a noteworthy positive push on labour share
as Finland entered the age of hyperglobalisation.233 Union density’s modest contri-
bution reflects the fact that the fraction of union members of total employees was
stagnating.
Comparing the determinants of labour share against each other, especially notable
is the significance of aggregate level variables, referring to time fixed effects. Al-
though it is impossible to know what the time fixed effects are precisely capturing,
I believe that the most plausible candidate is labour demand. My evaluation is in
line with the profile of time fixed effects, presented in Figure 12. There, it is clear
that some aggregate level variable lifted the bottom of labour share at least since
WWII while keeping the explanatory variables in equation (18) constant. An im-
portant point to stress is that the variation of time fixed effects is most likely not
related to technological change within industry, since the marginal effect of TFP
and capital-labour ratio are negative in both time series analysis and in panel re-
gressions. Labour demand, however, fits the overall pattern quite well: following the
232While Pohjola estimates, that ICT contributed nearly 40% ( (0.7+0.3)2.7 ≈ 0.37) of the aggregate
TFP growth rate in Finland between 1996–2005, Maliranta argues, that business restructuring
typically accounts for 20–50% of TFP growth within industries. See Pohjola 2017, p. 477 and
Mika Maliranta 2005, p. 27.
233Haaparanta et al. 2017, p. 23.
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Figure 12: Coefficients on time fixed effects from baseline specification (18)
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Major recessions Coefficients on time fixed effects
Notes: The red line represents coefficients on time fixed effects from specification (18), which is
the baseline model. The shaded areas represent major recessions, which are the Great Depression
1928–1933, the 1990s crisis 1991–1994 and the Great Recession 2009–2015.
unstable decades of the early 20th century including the Civil War, roaming inflation
and the Great Depression, time fixed effects experience a steady increase, which is
slightly disrupted by the stagflation years of the 1970s but ultimately cut by the
1990s crisis.234 Corresponding to booming labour demand, time fixed effects also
modulate during the Golden Age of 1950–1970 and the manic 1980s. Over the three
major recessions in 1928–1933, 1991–1994 and 2009–2015, the coefficients appear to
peak, coinciding well with behaviour of the economic cycle.
To summarize, I have proposed that the key factors determining the changes in func-
tional income distribution are technological advancement and shifts in bargaining
234The pattern of time fixed effects fits the business cycle description in Heikkinen 2017.
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power. Due to the low starting point and high substitutability between labour and
capital, labour share maintained a low level before WWII. During the four decades
post-WWII, it grew almost 30 percentage points, of which roughly a third corre-
sponds to an improvement in the bargaining position of employees. Following the
1990s recession, labour share declined continuously until 2007, before settling upon
the levels of the 1940s in 2015. The primary reason behind the turnaround in the
1990s was a rapid growth of total factor productivity, predicting over a half of the
decrease.
Furthermore, I would like to stress two points considering the recent decline in
labour share. First, a significant difference in comparison to previous periods is the
changing direction of common shocks. In 1991–2007, time fixed effects predicted a
considerable reduction in labour share, in contrast to the past. I argue, that the gulf
with the past could be due to a simultaenous transition from extensive to intensive
growth. As Finnish industry caught up with the technological frontier over the
1990s, growth could no longer rely on technological borrowing and accruing of factor
inputs. Consequently, labour demand moderated. Second, the downward bias in
capital intensity’s contribution is a pivotal detail. Without market imperfections the
connection between capital accumulation and labour share should be positive rather
than negative, neutralizing some or all of TFP’s negative influence. Thus, increased
monopoly rents have prevented the built-in balancing mechanism of neoclassical
economy.
According to my analysis, technology emerges as the most important determinant of
labour share in the long-term. The significance of technology complements previous
research, which has found it to be essential in the recent and rather universal decline
of labour share, beginning in around the 1970s.235 Earlier, and before WWII in
particular, technology worked as a substitute for labour, which was only natural
since machines were a lot faster in routine-intensive tasks than artisans. After mid-
century, technology began to increasingly complement and add the efficiency of the
workforce. In the ICT-era, technology is obviously still efficiency-improving, but
this time it also works potentially through rising concentration. As internet has
multiplied the scope of global markets, the market players have had to match the
235Section 3.2.
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expansion. The emergence of bigger players, which Autor et al. title adequately as
the superstar firms,236 suits with the economic history of Finnish industry, which
experienced such restructuring around the 1990s crisis over an unforeseen wave of
downsizings, mergers and bankruptcies.237
Secondary to technology, the changes in labour share are also driven by changes in
bargaining power. Following Autor et al., I propose that the other end of bargain-
ing power, namely market power, may have been squeezing labour share in recent
decades, as ICT in tandem with globalisation has enabled industrial branches to con-
centrate. Working to the opposite direction, union power appears to have boosted
labour share from 1943 to 1991, when majority of employees became organized. A
noteworthy point is, that this was possibly a one-time event, since in 2015 union
density is rather close to its theoretical maximum.
236See D. Autor, Dorn, F. Katz, et al. 2017. For related research, see Barkai 2016.
237Kyyra¨ and Mika Maliranta 2006.
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9 Conclusions
This thesis was motivated with the following question: ”What factors have deter-
mined the changes in labour share in Finnish industry over the 20th century?” In
short, I conclude that the changes could be plausibly explained by advancements
in production technology, along with shifts in the distribution of rents. Growing
union density and import exposure predicted an increase in labour share, while
greater TFP growth and capital accumulation appeared to increase capital share.
My interpretation is that union density worked through improving the bargain-
ing position of labour. Addedly, import exposure deteriorated the market power of
capitalists by enhancing the competitive pressure on product markets. Capital accu-
mulation reduced labour’s proportion of total income by substituting routine-based
work with machinery especially pre-WWII, but after that it captured mainly the
effect of increasing monopoly rents. Finally, I propose that TFP growth increased
the profitability of businesses, marking a genuine negative impact of labour saving
technology on labour share. Statistically or economically significant relation with
financialisation, public expenditure, devaluations or export exposure and the labour
share could not be robustly identified.
On top of the selected explanatory variables, large part of the variation in labour
share was left unexplained. This reflects the impact of time fixed effects, working
like a tide lifting (or lowering) all boats. In chapter 8 I speculated that the time
fixed effects could capture the influence of overall labour demand, or alternatively
policy actions like taxation or collective wage agreements. Ultimately, however, their
driver is left unknown. The relative importance of time fixed effects demonstrates
the difficulty of identification in macroeconomic settings.238
Despite the limited explanatory power, I believe my analysis can extend our under-
standing of the key mechanisms determining factor shares. Especially the long-term
drivers of labour share have thus far gone largely untested. Indeed, the most valuable
insight of this thesis is the robust observation that technology was a big deal even be-
fore the ICT-revolution. Moreover, the historical meltdown of labour share since the
beginning of the ICT-revolution was due to technology as well as the contraction
238For a splendid overview, see Nakamura and Steinsson 2017.
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of compensating forces, referring to bargaining power of employees. Nonetheless,
technology arises as the single most important force determining whether labour is
gaining or losing, according to my analysis.
The universal decline of labour share is often viewed as a harmful trend. This is
understandable, since lower labour shares typically imply higher income inequality,
which may cause feelings of unfairness, social problems and social unrest. Another
worry states that contracting labour share could remark the extinction of numerous
jobs which could lead to similar troubles as rising inequality. Thus, reversing the
decline might be of social planner’s interest. Based on the results above, a somewhat
comforting point is the observation that the decline of labour share is not purely
driven by market forces. Since bargaining power counts, the position of labour can be
improved by policy intervention. Taking account my analysis, one way to achieve this
could be revising the antitrust laws: in theory, assuming no market imperfections,
the impact of capital accumulation on labour share would be positive. Moreover, if
capital accumulation grew at same rate as TFP, the two variables would equal each
other out exactly, leaving labour share constant.239 If, however, making markets
more competitive would prove out to be unfeasible for one reason or the other,
another mean to even the odds would be strengthening the bargaining position of
employees.
239Acemoglu 2003, pp. 1–3.
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Appendix A The model
In contrast to chapter 4, in this Appendix I present the extended neoclassical model
applied in detail, including the necessary manipulations carried out when deriving
the critical equations. Obviously, my starting point is the Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) production function:
Q =
[
α(AL)−ρ + (1− α)(BK)−ρ
]− 1
ρ (25)
where α is a distribution parameter, ρ is a substitution parameter, and A and B
represent the respective productive efficiencies. I.e. as A increases, the use of labour
becomes more efficient, or alternatively, labour is saved. In addition, ρ and α satisfy
the conditions −1 < ρ < ∞ and 0 < α < 1. Next, to ease interpretation later on,
I derive an expression for the elasticity of substitution. By definition, elasticity of
substitution is formulated as:
σ =
d(K/L)
K/L
d(MPL/MPK)
MPL/MPK
=
d ln
(
K
L
)
d ln
(
MPL
MPK
) (26)
where MPL = ∂Q
∂L
is the marginal productivity of labour, and MPK = ∂Q
∂K
is
the marginal productivity of capital. To tackle the quest at hand, I compute the
first-order conditions for equation (25):
∂Q
∂L
= −1
ρ
X−
1
ρ
−1(−ραA−ρL−ρ−1),
where X is the term in square brackets. Simplifying:
=X−(
1
ρ
+1)αA−ρL−(1+ρ)
=X−(
1+ρ
ρ )αA−ρL−(1+ρ)
=X−(
1
ρ)X−(
ρ
ρ)αA−ρL−(1+ρ)
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Note that X−
1
ρ = Q, so X−(
ρ
ρ) = Qρ. Hence, we get:
=QQραA−ρL−(1+ρ)
=αA−ρL−(1+ρ)Q1+ρ
=αA−ρ
(
Q
L
)1+ρ
(27)
Proceeding similarly, ∂Q
∂K
is:
∂Q
∂K
= (1− α)B−ρ
(
Q
K
)1+ρ
(28)
Dividing (27) by (28) gives the marginal rate of technical substitution, MRTS =
MPL
MPK
, which is solved for K
L
:
∂Q
∂L
∂Q
∂K
=
αA−ρ
(
Q
L
)1+ρ
(1− α)B−ρ
(
Q
K
)1+ρ = α1− α
(
A
B
)−ρ (K
L
)1+ρ
= MPL
MPK(
K
L
)1+ρ
= MPL
MPK
(1− α)
α
(
A
B
)ρ
K
L
=
(
MPL
MPK
) 1
1+ρ
(1− α
α
) 1
1+ρ
(
A
B
) ρ
1+ρ
Taking logarithms, and then a partial derivative with respect to ln
(
MPL
MPK
)
yields
the elasticity:
ln K
L
= 11 + ρ ln
(
MPL
MPK
)
+ 11 + ρ ln
(1− α
α
)
+ ρ1 + ρ ln
(
A
B
)
⇒ ∂ ln
(
K
L
)
∂ ln
(
MPL
MPK
) = 11 + ρ = σ (29)
This implies equivalently, that ρ = 1−σ
σ
.
Given the expression for ρ, I can start to derive more informative formulations for
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both factor shares. Assuming that firms maximize profits, it is known that:
∂Q
∂L
= MPL = W
P
∂Q
∂K
= MPK = R
P
(30)
where W
P
, R
P
represent the real prices of both inputs.
Now, using (27), (28), (29) and (30), labour and capital share can be expressed as:
LS = W
P
L
Q
= ∂Q
∂L
L
Q
= αA−ρ
(
Q
L
)1+ρ (L
Q
)
= αA−ρ
(
Q
L
)ρ
= α
(
Q
AL
) 1−σ
σ
CS = (1− α)
(
Q
BK
) 1−σ
σ
(31)
According to equation (31), the relation between labour productivity, labour saving
technology and labour share depends on the elasticity of substitution. Analogically,
the relation between capital productivity, capital saving technology and capital share
is determined by the elasticity.
Now, rewriting labour share in terms of K
L
allows us to examine how capital accu-
mulation affects the labour share. Using (31) and (25):
LS = α
(
Q
AL
)ρ
= α
 [α(AL)−ρ + (1− α)(BK)−ρ]− 1ρ
AL
ρ
= α
(
[α(AL)−ρ + (1− α)(BK)−ρ]−1
ALρ
)
= α([α(AL)−ρ(AL)ρ + (1− α)(BK)−ρALρ]−1)
= α
(
[α + (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ
]−1
)
= α
α + (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ
⇒ ∂LS
∂
(
K
L
) = αρ(1− α)
(
B
A
)−ρ (
K
L
)−ρ−1
(
α + (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ)2
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Observe, that 1
α+(1−α)(BKAL )
−ρ =
(
Q
AL
)ρ
. So the above can be simplified:
= αρ(1− α)
(
B
A
)−ρ (K
L
)−ρ−1 ( Q
AL
)2ρ
= 1− σ
σ
α(1− α)
(
Q
AL
)2( 1−σσ ) (BK
AL
)−( 1−σσ ) (K
L
)−1
⇒

∂LS
∂(KL )
< 0, when σ > 1
∂LS
∂(KL )
> 0, when σ < 1
(32)
Where the implication in the end follows from the fact that all the other terms are
necessarily positive except for 1−σ
σ
. The conclusion from equation (32) is, that an
increase in capital accumulation, K
L
, decreases labour share, when the elasticity of
substitution is above unity. It has the opposite effect, when the elasticity is below
unity.
Similarly, I can examine the effect of labour saving technology on labour share:
∂LS
∂A
= −α (−ρ) (1− α)
(
BK
L
)−ρ ( 1
A
)−ρ−1 (− 1
A2
)
(
α + (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ)2
= αρ (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ ( 1
A
)−1 (
−A−2
) ( Q
AL
)2ρ
=
(1− σ
σ
)
α (1− α)
(
Q
AL
)2( 1−σσ ) (BK
AL
)−( 1−σσ )
A
(
−A−2
)
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)
α (1− α)
(
Q
AL
)2( 1−σσ ) (BK
AL
)− (1−σ)
σ
A−1
⇒

∂LS
∂A
> 0, if σ > 1
∂LS
∂A
< 0, if σ < 1
(33)
The above implies, that an increase in labour saving technology increases labour
share in case the elasticity of substitution is greater than one. The opposite happens,
when the elasticity is below one.
Next, I introduce the more plausible scenario, which accounts for imperfect compe-
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tition. Suppose that there exist mark-ups, pi, in the product markets, such that
∂Q
∂L
= MPL = piW
P
∂Q
∂K
= MPK = piR
P
where pi > 1. Solving for P
⇒ P = pi W(
∂Q
∂L
) , P = pi R(
∂Q
∂K
)
Now, factor shares can be rewritten as:
LS = W
P
L
Q
= W
(
∂Q
∂L
)
piW
L
Q
= 1
pi
(
∂Q
∂L
)
L
Q
= 1
pi
α
(
Q
AL
) 1−σ
σ
CS = 1
pi
(1− α)
(
Q
BK
) 1−σ
σ
(34)
Equation (34) suggests, that an increase in mark-up squeezes both labour and capital
shares. For labour share, I derive also the partial derivative:
∂LS
∂pi
= −
α
pi2
(
α + (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ)
α + (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ
2
= − α
pi2
(
α + (1− α)
(
BK
AL
)−ρ)( Q
AL
)2ρ
= − α
pi2
(
Q
AL
)−ρ ( Q
AL
)2ρ
= − α
pi2
(
Q
AL
) 1−σ
σ
(35)
Which asserts the negative correlation.
Finally, considering market imperfections in labour markets as well, I introduce
the possibility of wage bargaining. Suppose real wage is determined as a weighted
average:
W
P
= γQ
L
+ (1− γ)Wr
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a measure of bargaining power of employees. When employers
can single-handedly dictate labour market conditions, meaning γ = 0, the real wage
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equals some reservation wage W
P
= Wr. On the other hand, if unions dominate
the negotiation process, implying γ = 1, all the gains from increases in labour
productivity accrue to wages, equivalently W
P
= Q
L
.
Taking account wage bargaining, labour share takes the following form:
LS = W
P
L
Q
=
(
γ
Q
L
+ (1− γ)Wr
)
L
Q
= γ + (1− γ)Wr L
Q
⇒
LS = 1, if γ = 1LS = Wr (LQ) , if γ = 0
(36)
Translated to words, equation (36) implies that the greater the bargaining power of
unions, the closer the labour share is to one (or 100%, when speaking in percentages).
All in all, the selected model provides four important lessons for the mechanisms
determining the labour share. These can be read from equations (32), (33), (35)
and (36), and for convenience I offer a brief summary. The relation between capital-
labour ratio, labour-saving technology and the labour share is tied to the elasticity of
substitution. If the elasticity is below unity, an increase in the former has a positive
effect on labour share, while the latter’s impact is negative. In case the elasticity is
above unity, the exact opposite applies. In comparison, accumulation of monopoly
power always decreases labour share, while accumulation of bargaining power works
the other way. In the empirical section, I show that the complete model can explain
the patterns of Finnish labour share in industry during the last hundred years quite
coherently.
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Appendix B Figures and tables
Figure B1: Import and export exposure 1860–2015, by branch
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Notes: The branches with no observations have been omitted.
Sources: Exports and imports: Pihkala 1970; Oksanen & Pihkala 1975; Foreign trade statistics
1950–2001; Uljas database. GVA: Heikkinen & Hjerppe 1986; Hjerppe et al. 1976; NA 1960–1981;
NA 1975–2015.
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Figure B2: Union density 1907–2015, by branch
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Notes: Paper industry’s extraordinary high density is due to considerable amount of student and
pensioner members. The gaps in printing industry’s density correspond to the temporary shut
down of the head union Kirjatyo¨ntekija¨in liitto in 1957 and again in 1968. Mining industry has
been omitted due to only one observation.
Sources: Union members: Yli-Pietila¨ et al. 1990; Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1989–2015.
Employees: Heikkinen & Hjerppe 1986; Hjerppe et al. 1976; NA 1960–1981; NA 1975–2015.
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Figure B3: Capital-output ratio and rate of return on capital 1900–2015, by branch
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Notes: Rate of return on capital is defined as rit = CSit/
(
K
Y
)
it
, where CS = 100 − ALS is
capital share, and KY is capital-output ratio at market value.
Sources: Author’s own calculation: see section 6.2.
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Figure B4: Capital-output ratio and rate of return on capital 1900–2015, whole
industry
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Notes: Rate of return on capital is defined as rit = CSit/
(
K
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)
it
, where CS = 100 − ALS is
capital share, and KY is capital-output ratio at market value.
Sources: Capital-output ratio for whole industry is calculated following the same steps as with
the branch-level series. For details, see section 6.2.
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Figure B5: Import and export shares 1860–2015, by branch
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Notes: The branches with no observations have been omitted.
Sources: Pihkala 1970; Oksanen & Pihkala 1975; Foreign trade statistics 1950–2001; Uljas
database. GVA: Heikkinen & Hjerppe 1986; Hjerppe et al. 1976; NA 1960–1981; NA 1975–2015.
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Figure B6: Bivariate regressions between adjusted labour share and selected inde-
pendent variables, using five-year differences
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Notes: Each circle corresponds to one of the eleven branches in a bivariate regression of the form
∆ lnALSit = β0 + β1Xit + it, where X is one of the four explanatory variables. Each circle’s size
reflects each branch’s average employment in 1907–2015. The sample period for the technology
variables is 1900–2015, for union density 1907–2015, and for import exposure 1860–2015. The red
lines represent the respective regression lines.
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Table B1: Baseline models, with different definitions of labour share and lagged
explanatory variables
FE, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WS NALS ALS ALS
TFP -0.23*** -0.37*** -0.12* -0.22**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
K/L -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.09) (0.11)
Union density 0.12*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.04)
M
GV A
0.10*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
X
GV A
0.04* 0.02 0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
L3. K/L -0.39***
(0.06)
L5. K/L -0.39***
(0.07)
L3. Union density 0.13***
(0.03)
L5. Union density 0.13***
(0.03)
Constant 4.00*** 3.96*** 4.05*** 4.02***
(0.28) (0.16) (0.27) (0.27)
Branch fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.61 0.72 0.72 0.71
N 388 367 388 386
Note: Dependent variable is the wage share in specification (1), net adjusted labour share in
specification (2), and adjusted labour share in specifications (3) and (4). TFP is the growth
rate of total factor productivity, KL is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant
prices, expressed at thousands of euros, density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA
and XGVA , where the former is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the
value of exports as a share of GVA. All variables are expressed as log levels, except for TFP,
which is expressed as the annual growth rate in decimal form. Standard errors, which are block
bootstrap in specifications (1) and (2) and clustered in models (3) and (4), in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table B2: Baseline models, additional specifications
FD, OLS 5-year FD, WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP -0.43*** -0.46** -0.49** -0.50
(0.09) (0.16) (0.15) (0.27)
K/L -0.21** -0.23* -0.28* -0.54**
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19)
Union density 0.04** 0.04* 0.12** 0.15*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
trade
GV A
0.18** 0.10**
(0.07) (0.03)
M
GV A
0.16** 0.18
(0.05) (0.10)
X
GV A
0.04*** -0.05
(0.01) (0.03)
Constant 0.07** 0.06* 0.07 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.26)
Branch fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch-specific trends No No Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.33 0.41 0.37 0.43
N 571 372 102 63
Note: Dependent variable is the adjusted labour share. TFP is the growth rate of total factor
productivity, KL is the real net capital stock per employee at 2010 constant prices, expressed
at thousands of euros, density is the union density, tradeGV A is the sum of
M
GVA and
X
GVA , where
the former is the value of imports as a share of GVA and the latter is the value of exports as a
share of GVA. All variables in specifications (1) and (2) are expressed as log first differences,
except for TFP, which is expressed as the annual growth rate in decimal form. In specifica-
tions (3) and (4), all variables are expressed as log first differences over five years, except for
TFP, which is expressed as the cumulative growth over five years in decimal form. Specifica-
tions (3) and (4) have been weighted using each branch’s average employment in 1907–2015.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table B3: Averages of selected variables, by branch
ALS TFP K
L
density trade
GV A
M
GV A
X
GV A
strikes K
Y
r
Mining 65.8 3.3 101.5 30.5 50.2 . 50.2 637.3 5.0 11.4
Food etc. 48.0 1.1 62.7 45.6 334.6 323.6 12.8 476.1 4.7 12.4
Textile 62.9 2.3 17.7 35.7 212.3 162.4 53.3 396.7 2.5 13.7
Wood 66.3 2.2 37.2 39.6 250.4 16.0 245.6 589.0 4.0 8.7
Paper 44.7 3.4 193.7 70.3 227.8 20.3 225.3 801.1 6.3 10.0
Printing 71.3 1.4 27.1 50.0 12.2 12.2 . 903.3 1.8 19.9
Chemical 47.2 2.0 115.2 50.9 506.5 332.7 185.7 295.0 6.2 10.6
Non-metallic minerals 59.2 2.0 54.5 14.3 97.1 64.5 35.9 649.9 4.8 10.3
Metal 59.4 2.8 47.9 50.8 158.7 97.5 61.2 1533.4 2.7 14.7
Miscellaneous 64.0 2.1 43.0 11.7 . . . 240.5 6.5 14.0
Energy 27.4 1.5 566.1 18.2 . . . 195.6 10.3 7.4
Total 56.0 2.2 115.1 41.8 231.4 182.3 112.6 610.7 5.0 12.1
Note: The row Total refers to an arithmetic average of the eleven branches.
Source: See section 6.2.
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